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Preface 
Pursuant to Article 13(3) of Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the 
organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, the High 
Representative is held to provide a review of the organisation and functioning of the EEAS by 
mid-2013. This review will cover, inter alia, the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11), 
so as to ensure an adequate geographical and gender balance and a meaningful presence of 
nationals from all member states in the EEAS. If necessary, the review will be accompanied 
by appropriate proposals for the revision of the 2010 Council Decision (e.g., suggestions for 
additional specific measures to correct possible imbalances of staffing). In that case, the 
Council will, in accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise the Decision in light of the review 
by the beginning of 2014. 
This short and user-friendly legal commentary on the 2010 Council Decision is the first of its 
kind and is intended to inform those involved in the review process and to serve as a 
reference document for practitioners and analysts dealing with the EEAS. This commentary 
is not an elaborate doctrinal piece, but rather a textual and contextual analysis of each 
article, that takes account of i) other relevant legal provisions (primary, secondary, 
international), ii) the process leading to the adoption of the 2010 Council Decision (i.e. 
travaux préparatoires), iii) the preamble of the Council Decision, and iv) insofar as it is 
possible at this stage, early implementation. Wherever relevant, cross-references to other 
provisions of the EEAS Council Decision have been made so as to tie in the different 
commentaries and ensure overall consistency. 
The commentary has been produced by an independent, multinational and multidisciplinary 
team of scholars brought together by Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 
the European University Institute (EUI) and the Centre of European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 
the framework of the so-called ‘European External Action Service 2.0’ project. This research 
project is carried out in association with the Amsterdam Centre for European Law and 
Governance (ACELG), the Centre for the Law of EU External Relations (CLEER), the European 
Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), the Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies, 
and the University of Copenhagen. 
To serve the ulterior aims of the project, the research team will, in the upcoming months, 
collect views from different stakeholders about problems faced in the implementation of the 
EEAS Council Decision and challenges to the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. In 
particular, the project team will assess whether there is enough interpretative room in the 
current Council Decision to accommodate changes to the organisation and functioning of 
the EEAS à droit constant’. If the margins of appreciation appear too restricted, then the 
project will offer recommendations as to how to amend the 2010 Council Decision in order 
to improve the organisation and functioning of the EEAS. The research outputs of this next 
phase of the project will take the form of a policy briefing with recommendations, to be 
published at the end of June 2013. A more elaborate academic booklet, compiling all papers 
produced during the project, will appear this autumn. The products of the EEAS 2.0 project 
will be published through the regular channels of the research centres involved in this 
collaborative framework. 
 
Christophe Hillion & Steven Blockmans 
Research coordinators, ‘EEAS 2.0’ 
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List of terms and abbreviations 
 
AFCO  Constitutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
AFET   Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament 
CCA   Consultative Committee on Appointments  
CEOS  Conditions of Employment of Other Servants 
CFSP       Common Foreign and Security Policy                                                                                        
CMPD   Crisis Management and Planning Directorate 
COREPER Committee of Permanent Representatives 
CPCC  Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability 
DCI   Development Cooperation Instrument  
EEAS Decision Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning 
of the European External Action Service 
EDF  European Development Fund 
EIDHR    European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights  
ENPI   European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument  
EUMS  European Union Member States 
FAC         Foreign Affairs Council                                                                                              
FPI   Foreign Policy Instruments Service  
ICI   Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries 
NSCI  Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation  
nyr  not yet reported 
PSC   Political and Security Committee 
Quadrilogue Meeting involving the Council, the High Representative, the European 
Parliament and the European Commission 
SNE  Seconded national expert 
TEU          Treaty on the European Union                               
TFEU  Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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ARTICLE 1 
Nature and Scope 
 
 
1. This Decision establishes the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 
(‘EEAS’).  
2. The EEAS, which has its headquarters in Brussels, shall be a functionally autonomous body of the 
European Union, separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission with 
the legal capacity necessary to perform its tasks and attain its objectives. 
3. The EEAS shall be placed under the authority of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy (‘High Representative’).  
4. The EEAS shall be made up of a central administration and of the Union Delegations to third 
countries and to international organisations. 
 
 
Article 1 of the Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the 
European External Action Service (hereinafter the “EEAS Decision”)1 is entitled 
“nature and scope”. The provision not only sets out the nature and scope of action 
of the Service (Section 2), it also relates to the nature and scope of the Decision itself 
(Section 1). 
 
 
1. Nature and scope of the EEAS Decision 
 
 The EEAS Decision was adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 27(3) TEU,2 
which is the sole provision in the TEU and TFEU that deals with the EEAS.3 Article 
27(3) TEU contains three substantive elements on the Service: its name, its basic 
composition (“shall comprise officials from relevant departments of the General 
Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well as staff seconded from 
national diplomatic services of the Member States”) and, albeit in broadly 
defined terms, its essential functions:4  namely, to “assist” the High 
Representative and to “work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the 
Member States”.  The provision otherwise sets out a specific procedure to 
establish “[t]he organisation and functioning of the European External Action 
                                                             
1
 Council Decision 2010/42/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External 
Action Service; OJ 2010 L201/30. 
 
2
 See Preamble EEAS Decision. 
 
3
 The EEAS is also mentioned in Declarations 13 and 14, concerning the common foreign and security 
policy, and Declaration 15 on Article 27 of the TEU. 
 
4
 See the discussion on Article 2 EEAS Decision, below. 
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Service...  [whereby the] Council shall act on a proposal from the High 
Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after obtaining the 
consent of the Commission”.  
 
 Article 27(3) TEU thus gives a mandate to EU institutions to build upon the Treaty 
provisions on the EEAS. Yet this mandate appears to be narrowly defined. The 
Council is empowered to adopt a decision only to establish the “organisation and 
functioning” of the EEAS,5 as indeed recalled in the first paragraph of the EEAS 
Decision’s preamble, in its Article 1(1), and in its very title.  While the notions of 
“organisation and functioning” could be understood broadly, whether the EEAS 
Decision, in view of its legal basis, could have included anything more than the 
general statements on the Service’s mandate that it encloses is subject to 
question.6  
 
 Article 27(3) is located in the CFSP chapter of the TEU (Chapter 2, Title V). Thus, 
formally, the EEAS Decision is a CFSP act, which in turn would suggest that the 
EEAS is conceived as a CFSP creature. Yet, the numbering of the Decision in the 
Official Journal of the EU (“2010/427/EU”) contains an “EU” rather than the 
“CFSP” reference that CFSP acts usually hold.7 The question can thus be raised as 
to whether the EEAS Decision was conceived as a measure having horizontal 
nature and scope, rather than of CFSP character only. Such a broad ambit 
appears to be borne out by the provisions of the Decision itself,8 and would 
incidentally explain the General Court’s uninhibited approach to the Decision 
that transpires from its Order in case Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European 
Union to Montenegro.9 To be sure, the procedure set out in Article 27(3) TEU 
does contrast with the archetypal CFSP decision-making procedure evoked in 
Article 24(1) and 31 TEU, for example, notably in view of the significant roles it 
                                                             
5
 That the Treaty of Lisbon left it to the EU institutions to elaborate the organisation and functioning 
of the EEAS is quite remarkable in view of the notable preoccupation with ?competence  that 
otherwise constrained its drafting. It also indicates that the tangible contribution of the EEAS to 
furthering coherence essentially depends on the institutions being willing and able to agree. 
6
 See the discussion on Article 2 EEAS Decision, below. 
 
7
 E.g. Council Decision 2012/392/CFSP of 16 July 2012 on the European Union CSDP mission in Niger 
(EUCAP Sahel Niger) (OJ L 187, 17.7.2012, p. 48–51); Council Decision 2012/333/CFSP of 25 June 2012 
updating the list of persons, groups and entities subject to Articles 2, 3 and 4 of Common Position 
2001/931/CFSP on the application of specific measures to combat terrorism and repealing Decision 
2011/872/CFSP (OJ L 165, 26.6.2012, pp. 72–74). 
 
8
 See, for instance, Article 9 of the EEAS Decision, on external action instruments and programming; 
and discussion of that provision, below.  
 
9
 The GC appears to consider that it has jurisdiction on the Decision; see Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v 
Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr, paras. 31ff. 
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attributes to the supranational political institutions of the Union. In particular, 
the Commission has to give its consent for the decision to be adopted, while the 
Parliament has the right to be consulted, a right that in practice endowed it with 
a significant influence over the decision-making process.10 The rationale for 
locating the legal basis of the EEAS decision in the CFSP chapter of the TEU can 
thus be questioned.11 
 
 If the EEAS Decision was indeed conceived as a CFSP act, its scope is in principle 
circumscribed by the non-contamination principle of Article 40(1) TEU.12 While 
the Court of Justice has recalled that the “Union's competence in matters of [the 
CFSP] shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the 
Union’s security”,13 the provisions of the EEAS Decision cannot in principle affect 
the application of the “procedures and the extent of the powers of the 
institutions laid down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences 
referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union”. That would arguably be the case if the Decision legally affected the 
powers of the Commission,14 for example, as established in the TFEU.15 
                                                             
10
 For more  on the process leading to the adoption of the decision, see B. Van Vooren, “A legal-
institutional perspective on the European External Action Service”, CLEER Working Paper 2010/7; and 
L. Erkelens and S. Blockmans, “Setting up the European External Action Service: An institutional act of 
balance” (2012) 8 European Constitutional Law Review, pp. 246-279. 
11
 The provision on the EEAS in the Treaty establishing the Constitution was also located in the specific 
CFSP Chapter (Article III-296).  
 
12
 According to Article 40(1) TEU: “The implementation of the common foreign and security policy 
shall not affect the application of the procedures and the extent of the powers of the institutions laid 
down by the Treaties for the exercise of the Union competences referred to in Articles 3 to 6 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”. Article 40 TEU is mentioned specifically in Article 
4(3)(a) of the EEAS decision, in the section concerning the role of CSDP bodies included in the EEAS 
central administration, as if none of the other provisions of the decision were in any way likely to 
raise issues of compatibility with Article 40 TEU. This would tend to further support the notion that 
the decision has a horizontal dimension. 
 
13
 See C-130/10 European Parliament v Council, Judgment of 19 July 2012, nyr, at para 62. 
  
14
 In this regard, see the discussion on the ‘normal tasks’ of the Commission evoked in Article 2 EEAS 
Decision, below. 
 
15
 In view of the case law related to former Article 47 TEU (e.g. Case C-91/05 Commission v Council 
[2008] ECR I-3651), questioning the validity of a CFSP act such as the EEAS decision by reference to 
the non-contamination principle (now enshrined in Article 40(1) TEU), can arise not only in the 
context of annulment proceedings (Article 263 TFEU, i.e. within two months following the adoption of 
the decision), but also through a plea of illegality (Article 277 TFEU), if a decision was adopted on the 
basis of the 2010 Decision – as there have been in practice (E.g. Joint Decision of the Commission and 
the HR on Cooperation Mechanisms concerning the Management of Delegations of the European 
Union, JOIN(2012)8, 28.3.2012) or arguably through a preliminary ruling procedure (Article 267 TFEU).  
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 Incidentally, the ECOWAS case law leaves important interpretative scope for the 
EEAS in line with the principle of coherence. First, where acts do not resort to 
“legal effect”,16 Article 40 TEU is not violated.  Hence the Service can play an 
important role in non CFSP-issues without violating the non-contamination 
clause.  Second, the Court in ECOWAS also left room for legal instruments which 
do not “implement” TEU (CFSP) or TFEU policies, but which function at a level of 
generality in order to ensure coherent EU external policies, and therefore do not 
”prejudice questions of competence”.17  Thus, legally the EEAS has quite a bit of 
leeway to fully play its role in ensuring coherence across all EU foreign policies, 
regardless of Article 40 TEU. 
 
 The scope and nature of the EEAS Decision should also be considered in the light 
of Declaration 14 (annexed to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference 
which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon) according to which: “the provisions covering 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy including in relation to the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the 
External Action Service will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities, and 
powers of each Member State in relation to the formulation and conduct of its 
foreign policy, its national diplomatic service, relations with third countries and 
participation in international organisations, including a Member State's 
membership of the Security Council of the United Nations” (emphasis added). 
Thus in principle, the EEAS Decision as CFSP act could not be formulated in such a 
way as to affect member states’ (diplomatic services) responsibilities and powers 
in those specific domains. 
 
 
2. Nature and scope of the Service 
 
 In line with the position defended by the member states,18 and in contrast to the 
wishes of the European Parliament (and of the Commission),19 Article 1 EEAS 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
 
16
 See C. Hillion and R.A. Wessel, “Competence Distribution in EU External Relations after ECOWAS: 
Clarification or Continued Fuzziness” (2009) 46 Common Market Law Review, pp. 551-586. 
 
17
 See B. Van Vooren, “The Small Arms Judgment in an Age of Constitutional Turmoil” (2009) 14 
European Foreign Affairs Review, pp. 231-248. 
 
18
 See e.g. Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 
14930/09, 23 October 2009. 
 
19
 See e.g. Brok Report to the Committee on constitutional affairs on the institutional aspects of 
setting up the European External Action Service (2009/2133(INI)) A7-0041/2009. 
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Decision emphasises the autonomous character of the EEAS in several ways. 
Made up of its own “central administration and of the Union Delegations to third 
countries and to international organisations”, the Service is conceived as “a 
functionally autonomous body” of the EU, placed “under the authority of the High 
Representative”, and “separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and 
from the Commission”. It is endowed with a “legal capacity necessary to perform 
its tasks and attain its objectives”. 
 
 
(i) A “body” of the Union 
 
 As a “body” (translated as “organe” in French), the EEAS is not formally included 
in the list of EU institutions enshrined in Article 13 TEU, although it is envisaged 
as such for the purpose of the Staff and Financial regulations,20 respectively.21  
 
 The notion of “body” is referred to in and regulated by several provisions of EU 
primary law.22  Akin to EU institutions, a “body” is bound by e.g. the provisions of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental rights (see Article 51 EUCFR). Indeed, as a body, 
the EEAS may be brought to Court, e.g. under Articles 263 and 265 TFEU, 
according to which “acts of bodies intended to have legal effects on third 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
20
 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1080/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
24 November 2010 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, OJ L311, 26.11.2010, p. 1; 
Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 amending Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as regards the European 
External Action Service, OJ L 311, 26.11.2010, p. 9 
 
21
 See pt 8 of Preamble of the EEAS Decision; see also the discussion on Articles 6 and 8 EEAS 
Decision, below. 
 
22
 Here are some Treaty Provisions having legal relevance for EU “bodies”: TEU: Article 9 (all bodies 
respect democratic principles), TFEU: Article 15(1) (transparency by all EU bodies); Article 15(3) 
(access to documents of all bodies); Article 16 (personal data protection by EU bodies); Articles 20 & 
24 (citizens may petition “advisory bodies” of the EU); Article 71 (representatives of EU bodies may 
participate in standing committee on internal security); Article 88 (Europol receiving info from 
‘bodies’); Articles 123 & 124 (prohibition of ECB overdraft facilities to EU bodies); Article 226 (EP 
enquiries into maladministration, without prejudice to competence of other EU bodies or 
institutions), Article 228 (1)(EU ombudsman may receive complaints on EU bodies’ activities); Article 
263 (review of legality of acts of bodies, and acts of those bodies may set up conditions concerning 
actions against them); Article 265 (failure to act also applicable to EU bodies), 267 (prelim. reference 
on acts of bodies of the EU), Article 287 1 & 3 (CoA examines accounts of all EU bodies), Article 298 
(EU bodies have support of open efficient and independent European administration), Article 325 
(combating fraud in all EU bodies). 
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parties” may be challenged before the European Court of Justice in case of 
violation of EU law.23  
 
 More generally, some of the Treaty principles governing the functioning of 
“institutions” are arguably applicable to bodies such as the EEAS. For instance, 
while Article 11 TEU on transparency, accessibility, included in the Title on 
“democratic principles”, only refers to EU “institutions”, the rules it encapsulates 
may apply mutatis mutandis to agencies or bodies given that Article 9 TEU, which 
operates as chapeau of this Title, emphasises that “[i]n all its activities, the Union 
shall observe the principle of the equality of its citizens, who shall receive equal 
attention from its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies” (emphasis added). At 
the very least, provisions applying to institutions in the context of primary law 
apply to the EEAS when functioning as an “institution”, viz. for the purpose of the 
Staff and Financial Regulations.24 
 
 While the EEAS, as a body, may be sued, the question may be raised as to 
whether it may also bring a case before the Courts. Such a standing could be 
derived from the “legal capacity” with which the EEAS is endowed “to perform its 
tasks and attain its objectives” (Article 1(2) EEAS).25 Indeed, akin to the European 
Parliament in 1970-80s,26  the Service ought to be able to defend its prerogatives 
before the Court of Justice precisely “to perform its tasks and attain its 
objectives”, however vaguely crafted they may be in the Decision.27 Admittedly, 
such standing would however be complicated to exercise in practice given that 
the EEAS falls under the authority of the HR, who in turn is structurally tied both 
to the Commission (as VP) and to the Council (as HR and President of the FAC). 
Still, it is not inconceivable that, occasionally, the EEAS and the HR, on the one 
hand, and the Commission, on the other, might not share the same interest.28  
                                                             
23
 See in this respect Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, 
Judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr, para. 26, and para. 73 a contrario. 
 
24
 See discussion on Articles 6 and 8 EEAS Decision, below. 
 
25
 The EEAS also has its own Legal Affairs Division. 
 
26
 See Case 294/83 Les Verts v Parliament [1986] ECR 1339; and Case C-70/88 Parliament v Council 
[1990] ECR I-2041. 
 
27
 See the discussion under Article 2 EEAS Decision, below. 
 
28
 The case C-658/11 European Parliament v Council of the European Union on the EU agreement with 
Mauritius is a case in point: it has been suggested that the HR ought to intervene in support of the 
Council against the European Parliament, which is supported by the European Commission, which 
intervenes contrary to the legal advice of the EEAS Legal Affairs Department.  
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(ii) A “functionally autonomous” body 
 
 Undoubtedly its structural links with the Council and Commission may 
circumscribe the autonomy of the EEAS. To be sure, in defining the Service as a 
“functionally autonomous body”, the decision appears to qualify the very 
autonomy that it enjoys.  
 
 This qualified autonomy may indeed be related to the title and scope of the EEAS 
Decision itself, namely the “organisation and functioning of the EEAS”.  In 
particular, it may be wondered whether the emphasis in Article 1 on the 
functional autonomy of the Service suggests that the latter is, by contrast, not 
organisationally autonomous.  If so, then the question arises as to where the 
dividing line lies between ‘functioning’ and ‘organisation’.  Arguably, 
“functioning” refers to carrying out its tasks of formulating policy proposals, 
information-gathering, etc., which the EEAS does autonomously from the 
Commission, whereas organisation refers to elements such as 1) the Staff and 
Financial Regulations where the EEAS has to respect relevant rules,29 2) 
accountability to the European Parliament, and 3) the fact that it is ‘under the 
authority’ of the HR.   
 
 A reading of different language versions of the Decision confirms that the EEAS is 
not organisationally but only functionally autonomous in carrying out its tasks. 
Hence, the French text of Article 1 envisages the Service as “un organe de l'Union 
européenne fonctionnant de manière autonome”,30 an expression that sounds less 
conceptual and perhaps more practical than the English phrase.31 The notion of 
functioning autonomously evoked by the French version might suggest that when 
fulfilling its “tasks” (to use the terminology of Article 2 EEAS) the Service does not 
need the organisational support of another actor; i.e. that it is organisationally 
and operationally self-sufficient. Note that many language versions call the EEAS 
                                                             
29
 As regards the EU delegation in particular, see Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European 
Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr. 
 
30
 Similarly, the Italian version refers to “un organo dell’Unione europea che opera in autonomia 
funzionale”, while the Danish version mentions “et funktionelt autonomt EU-organ”. The Dutch text 
describes the Service as “een functioneel autonoom orgaan van de Europese Unie”. 
 
31
 Since the Decision was drafted in English, this text arguably best reflects the inter-institutional 
compromise, yet formally and legally, this does not matter as all language versions have equally 
authentic value. 
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an “organ of the EU”, with all that this possibly entails in terms of attribution of 
acts and ability to bind the legal person of which it is an organ.32  
 
 In view of the above discussion on organisational v functional autonomy, the 
question may be raised as to whether the EEAS bringing court cases itself does fall 
under functioning, or organisation.  Via the VP, the EEAS is certainly closely linked 
to the Commission.  However, it stands under the authority of the HR, this means 
that it is the ”office of the High Representative” which, due to organisational 
dependence, is the one that ought to defend the prerogatives of the EEAS. Does 
this then mean that such an office is the entity that should be considered the 
”body” for purposes of Article 267 TFEU? 
 
 However qualified, the autonomy of the EEAS could increase in view of several 
elements contained in the Decision and as a result of internal practices. Hence, 
while the Decision foresees that the Service has its own budget and staff,33 the 
latter has been organised and labelled to underscore the singular administrative 
identity of the Service (e.g. “Managing Directorates” rather than the classical 
Directorates-General, headed by a “Corporate Board”), epitomised by a distinct 
logo, separate website, and indeed specific email address. 
 
 The autonomy of the EEAS could also be bolstered thanks to the “legal capacity” it 
is endowed with “to perform its tasks and attain its objectives”. In particular, this 
capacity may be used for articulating the Service’s mandate by reference to 
“objectives” which, in contrast to its “tasks” listed in Article 2, are not spelled out 
anywhere in the Decision – at least not explicitly.  
 
 
(iii) “separate from the General Secretariat of the Council and from the Commission” 
 
 Unlike the autonomy of the EEAS, the notion that the Service is separate from the 
General Secretariat of the Council (GSC) and from the Commission is not qualified, 
either organisationally or functionally.  
 
 Separate from the GSC and from the Commission, the Service organisationally 
falls under the authority of the HR, as stipulated in Articles 1(3) and 2. It is indeed 
                                                             
32
 See in this respect, H.G. Schermers and N. M. Blokker, International Institutional Law (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 5th Edition, 2011). 
  
33
 See the discussion under Articles 6 and 8 EEAS Decision, below. Indeed, as regards the EEAS 
personnel, a number of cases already having been decided by or are currently pending before the civil 
service tribunal: See cases F-15/11 (on EEAS officials having to move out of a hotel in Kabul) and F-
64/12 (on refusal of a promotion).  
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noteworthy that Article 1(3) EEAS Decision only refers to the HR, while it does not 
contain any reference to the incumbent’s function as Vice-President of the 
European Commission (the same holds true for Article 2(1)).34 This suggests that 
the EEAS cannot be regarded as a service of the Commission and must therefore 
be separate from it. This also means that, formally, only the HR/VP can instruct 
the EEAS.  
 
 However, other provisions ought to be considered. Article 2(2) EEAS Decision 
establishes the obligation of the Service to assist the presidents of the European 
Council and of the Commission respectively, as well as the Commission as a 
whole, ”in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external 
relations”. This obligation could be read as allowing the actors mentioned to 
instruct the EEAS, albeit arguably in consultation with the HR/VP. Moreover, it 
should be recalled that the EEAS staff, particularly Heads of Delegations, might 
sometimes operate qua Commission, for instance when acting with delegated 
powers of budget implementation.35 The Commission’s Rules of Procedure may 
also apply to the EEAS when it leads the negotiations of framework agreements 
covering both CFSP and non-CFSP matters – as regards the latter.36 
 
 While relative, the separate character of the EEAS has been consolidated in 
practice, at least partly. The Service’s original umbilical link with the Commission 
and GSC will at some point be severed. While originally made of transferred staff 
from the Commission and the Council, the EEAS personnel will be increasingly 
diversified, notably as the Service will be able to recruit not only from other 
institutions, but also more broadly on the basis of open competitions.37 
Moreover, and perhaps more symbolically, the EEAS has its own separate 
premises. Instead of being located in a building of the Commission (e.g.: 
                                                             
 
34
 It should be noted that para 1 of the Preamble of the EEAS Decision stipulates that “the reference 
to the term ‘High Representative’ will be interpreted in accordance with his/her different functions 
under Article 18 TEU”. Further on this point, see the discussion under Article 2 EEAS Decision, below. 
 
35
 See Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 
June 2012, nyr; and commentary of Article 8, below. 
 
36
 See the Vademecum on the External Action of the European Union (SEC(2011)881); and the 
“Operational guidelines for the preparation and conduct of negotiations for framework agreements 
with third countries involving both the European Commission and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)”.  
 
37
 See also discussion on Article 6 EEAS Decision, below. 
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Charlemagne) or of the Council (e.g. Lex), it is placed in-between the 
headquarters of these institutions, on the Schuman Roundabout.38 
 
  
                                                             
38
 Some units of the EEAS nevertheless remain located within the Council or the Commission premises 
(see the discussion under Article 12 EEAS Decision, below), while the EEAS hosts Commission staff 
(viz. Foreign Policy Instruments Service). 
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ARTICLE 2 
Tasks 
1. The EEAS shall support the High Representative in fulfilling his/her mandates as outlined, notably, in 
Articles 18 and 27 TEU:  
— in fulfilling his/her mandate to conduct the Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’) of the 
European Union, including the Common Security and Defence Policy (‘CSDP’), to contribute by 
his/her proposals to the development of that policy, which he/she shall carry out as mandated by 
the Council and to ensure the consistency of the Union’s external action,  
— in his/her capacity as President of the Foreign Affairs Council, without prejudice to the normal 
tasks of the General Secretariat of the Council,  
— in his/her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the 
responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations, and in coordinating other aspects of the 
Union’s external action, without prejudice to the normal tasks of the services of the Commission.  
2. The EEAS shall assist the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and 
the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions in the area of external relations. 
 
Article 2 defines the tasks of the External Action Service. It does this both in functional 
(section 1) and policy terms (section 2). 
 
1. The functional tasks of the EEAS 
 
 In describing the mandate of the EEAS, Article 2 of the Council Decision 
largely reflects the structure of Articles 18 and 27 TEU to which it refers in 
the chapeau.  Article 18 is found in Title II “Institutions” of the TEU, and is 
therefore of general application. By contrast, Article 27 is included in Title V – 
Chapter 2 of the TEU, and is therefore specific to the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Article 2 of the EEAS Council Decision merges these general 
and CFSP-specific aspects to attain an integrated support mandate for the 
office of the HR/VP/FAC Chairperson.  
 
 The aforementioned triple-hatted position is set out in Article 18 TEU.  The 
first paragraph contains the procedure for the appointment of the office 
holder, and the following paragraphs describe the three hats in the following 
succession: Article 18 (2) refers to the High Representative conducting the 
EU’s CFSP; Article 18 (3) refers to the High Representative presiding the 
Foreign Affairs Council; and Article 18 (4) establishes that the High 
Representative shall be one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission, ensure 
the consistency of the Union’s external action, and be responsible within the 
Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for 
coordinating aspects of the Union’s external action. Article 2 (1) EEAS 
Decision exactly follows the sequencing of functions set out in Article 18 TEU; 
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and merges them, through its first indent, with the CFSP-related tasks as 
described in Article 27 TEU.  
 
 In other words, Article 2 creates a mandate of support for the EEAS in 
relation to all three hats of the High Representative, and this with no 
hierarchy between them. Arguing to the contrary would imply the re-
introduction of the pre-Lisbon pillar approach, which contravenes the spirit 
of the Treaties. Indeed, the rationale of the triple hats – even since the 
European Convention in 2002 - is that the person holding this office would 
integrate all aspects of EU external relations more smoothly to ensure 
coherence across the multitude of EU actors and instruments.39  It is 
therefore crucial to point out that the triple-hatted post of High 
Representative is created by Article 18 in the general institutional Title of the 
Treaty on European Union, and not the specific Chapter on CFSP in the TEU. 
Indeed, CFSP as described in Article 27 TEU is but one of the three main tasks 
of the High Representative named in the more fundamental Article 18 TEU, 
alongside that of FAC Chairperson and Commission Vice President.  The EEAS 
then works rather like a chameleon: functioning akin to a Commission DG in 
relation to certain VP-related tasks; functioning akin to the Council General 
Secretariat in CFSP or FAC related tasks; without one support function taking 
precedence over the other, but with interlocking and equal importance. 
 
 The EEAS’ tasks are largely described by reference to the tasks of other 
prominent actors40 in EU external relations: the HR/VP/FAC Chairperson 
predominantly, but also the Presidents of the European Council and of the 
Commission, respectively, the Council General Secretariat and the 
Commission.  The description in relation to them is thus both ‘negative’ and 
‘positive’:  e.g. positive - by stating that its task is one of support/assistance in 
light of the mandates or functions of these EU actors; negative – by 
proscribing its function “without prejudice” to the “normal tasks” of the 
Commission services and the Council General Secretariat.  One must thus 
look at the exact description of the tasks and functions of the EEAS in relation 
to these actors, and establish what the normal tasks of the respective actors 
are in order to uncover the EEAS’ mandate.  The reference to “normal” 
creates a tension where it assumes there is a common understanding of the 
respective tasks of the competent EU actors in external policy-making.  
However, it is axiomatic that the advent of the EEAS would create a “new 
                                                             
39
 The European Convention, Final Report of the Working Group VII on External Action, CONV 459/02, 
Brussels, 16 December 2002, 19. 
 
40
 E.g. not only EU institutions in accordance with Article 13 TEU. 
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normal”, which this provision does not define. In the context of the ongoing 
Review, and in view of the possible revision of the EEAS decision, the “normal 
tasks” of each of the actors/institutions could be clarified, notably in 
consideration of the way in which they have been fleshed out in the first two 
years of the EEAS’ work: namely a predominant classical foreign policy (CFSP) 
focus over an emphasis on the coherence mandate across EU external action 
as a whole.41  
 
 In terms of wording, Article 2 meticulously balances the different functional 
and substantive positions and inter-relationships to ensure the “sui generis” 
nature of the EEAS in relation to the other actors mentioned in that 
provision. As previously indicated, it also fleshes out the triple hats of the 
HR/VP. As regards the subtle differences in wording, we may note the 
following:  
1. Paragraph 1 speaks of “mandates” (plural) of the HR and paragraph 2 
speaks of “function” in relation to the Presidents of the Commission and 
the European Council. 
 
2. Within paragraph 1 there is then a differentiation between the first 
indent, which speaks of the “mandate” to conduct the CFSP, and the 
second and third indents which speak of her “capacity” as Chair of the 
FAC and VP of the Commission.  
 
3. There is also the distinction between the task of “supporting” the High 
Representative in fulfilling her mandates, and that of “assisting” the 
President of the European Council, President of the Commission, and the 
Commission itself.  
 
4. Finally, the third indent of paragraph 1 then establishes a link between 
the Commission and the EEAS through the HR qua VP.  It reads that the 
EEAS shall support the HR/VP “...in his/her capacity as Vice-President of 
the Commission for fulfilling within the Commission the responsibilities 
incumbent on it in external relations” (emphasis added).  The word “it” 
refers to the Commission, and thus the EEAS is to support the VP in 
carrying out the external relations responsibilities of the Commission.  
 
 In two years of EEAS practice, it can be observed that these differences in 
formulation have a real-life relevance and policy impact. In relation to 
                                                             
41
 See report prepared for the AFET Committee of the European Parliament, The Organis?zation and 
Functioning of the EEAS: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, to be published end February 
2013. 
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assisting the function of the Presidents of the European Commission and the 
European Council, the task of the EEAS mainly consists of providing 
preparatory material for summits and visits in the form of briefings.  
“Assisting” these two Presidents in their “function” is hence more limited 
than “supporting” the High Representative in her “mandates” and 
“capacities”. We may thus observe that “mandates” refers to substantive 
policy tasks being given to the actor holding the mandate; whereas 
“function” and “capacity” are more informative and managerial in nature.  
This is underlined by the fact that the kind of support tasks (paragraph 1) or 
assistance (paragraph 2) to be given by the EEAS are also different.42   This 
has an important consequence for the mandate of the EEAS in relation to the 
triple hats of the High Representative.  Through an a contrario reasoning we 
submit that the EEAS is thereby more than a mere ‘briefing-generating 
machine’ in all three tasks listed in Article 2 (1) of the EEAS Decision, but an 
entity that is meant to proactively generate novel policy ideas, notably in line 
with the coherence mandate which it is expected to support (Art 18 (4) TEU 
iuncto Article 2 EEAS Council Decision). This means that the notion of “normal 
tasks” of the Council Secretariat and the Commission must duly take account 
of this. Finally, these findings ought therefore to be connected to different 
provisions in the Council Decision, notably Article 3 (Duty of Cooperation), 
Article 5 (Delegations) and Article 9 (Programming).  
 
 The fact that Article 2 (1) and (2) differentiate between support and 
assistance for the High Representative and the actors named in Article 2 (2) 
creates a different functional relationship as regards being able to “instruct” 
the EEAS to carry out certain task for the respective office holder or 
institution. This can be illustrated by reference to the EEAS’ tasks in relation 
to the President of the European Council. It has been reported that the work 
of the EEAS in supporting Mr. Van Rompuy – for example at the G20 – has 
                                                             
42
 Compare however different language versions of these two paragraphs, which paint a mixed 
picture. In French, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 2 of the Council Decision use the same verb 
“assister”, but they distinguish between “dans l'exécution de ses mandats ” in paragraph 1 and “dans 
l'exercice de leurs fonctions respectives” in paragraph 2. In the Dutch and Danish versions two 
different verbs are used: “ondersteunen”/” støtter” (para 1) and “bijstaan”/”bistår” (para 2) “in de 
uitoefening van zijn mandaat”/” dennes mandater” (para 1) and “hun taken”/”deres funktioner” 
(para 2).  The Dutch and Danish versions thus precisely match the English language version (which 
was the language in which the document has been negotiated), but this is less true for the French 
version. Moving to the Italian version, there is yet another reading : here these paragraphs twice use 
the identical “Il SEAE assiste” and both paragraphs also refer to “funzioni”, thus contradicting the 
subtle differences of the English language version. Finally the German version speaks twice of 
“unterstützt”, but distinguishes between “seines Auftrags” and “ihrer Aufgaben”. 
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been ‘top notch’43, but that the notion of what “assistance” means causes 
practical difficulties: in the pre-Lisbon era, the rotating presidency had a clear 
top-to-bottom chain of command in preparing external representation all the 
way down to expert working group level.  However, in the new system the 
office of the European Council, and that of the EEAS, have been created 
without truly “embedding them” in a clear structure and hierarchy.  Thus, 
President Van Rompuy only has “chain of command” over his cabinet, and 
while the EEAS is there to “assist” the office holder. This implies that the 
President of the European Council holds no hierarchical superiority and has 
no legal competence to give instructions.44 This means that the preparatory 
process within the Union is more infused with a number of political or 
institutional interests, is more based on personal relationships and good will, 
which require more energy to steer EU external relations towards a desirable 
outcome.  
 
2. The substantive tasks of the EEAS 
 
 Whereas Article 2 EEAS Decision defines the tasks of the EEAS in functional 
terms, there is very little reference to the substantive policy tasks of the 
Service. Article 2(1), indent 1, is the only segment of the provision which 
mentions two explicit substantive policy-related tasks: first, support the High 
Representative to conduct and formulate policy proposals in the field of 
CFSP/CSDP; and second to support the High Representative in “ensuring 
consistency” of EU external relations as a whole.  
 
 In terms of drafting there is an important, yet subtle difference between 
Article 2 (1) first and third indents; and Article 18 (2) and (4).  In the Treaty, 
Article 18 (2) refers only to policy-making tasks in relation to the CFSP of the 
High Representative.  Article 2 (1) first indent of the EEAS Decision copies the 
Treaty formulation, but adds the task of ensuring consistency in EU external 
action.  Conversely, in Article 18 (4) TEU we find the Vice-Presidential 
Commission hat of the High Representative, which explicitly includes tasks in 
relation to consistency of EU external action, which are faithfully reproduced 
in Article 2 (1) third indent, EEAS Decision. This implies that the EEAS is given 
a stronger (compared to the Treaties) coherence-oriented mandate for EU 
external relations as a whole, and not simply a CFSP-oriented mandate. 
 
                                                             
43
 See the report prepared for the AFET Committee of the European Parliament, The Organisation and 
Functioning of the EEAS: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, to be published end February 
2013. 
 
44
 Ibid. 
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 As regards balancing the CFSP task versus the over-arching coherence 
mandate of the EEAS, it is being reported that the EEAS has so far focused 
mainly on its foreign policy tasks, even to the point where the EEAS finds 
itself in competition with the member states on ‘classical foreign policy’.45  
This begs the question of whether the coherence mandate of the EEAS ought 
to be strengthened. A revised EEAS Decision could strengthen the Service’s 
mandate as regards EU policy coherence by including additional legal bases 
of a more substantive nature.  This would then change the purely “CFSP 
nature” of the Decision, and therefore support a wider ambit of EEAS tasks, 
albeit within the current Treaty framework.  Notably, a new Decision could 
have regard to Articles 21 TEU and 205 TFEU. In this sense, such a new legal 
basis of the EEAS 2.0 Decision on the “(organisation and) functioning” of the 
EEAS would constitutionally embed and substantively widen its function of 
contributing to the HR’s mandate of ensuring consistency in EU external 
action (as currently stated in Article 2(1), first indent, of the EEAS Decision; as 
well as the Decision’s preamble). As previously stated in this commentary, 
such a dual legal basis is not necessarily incompatible with Article 40 TEU as it 
can be seen as implementing a duty of coherence and cooperation, “without 
prejudice” to questions of competence.46 
 
 As regards the formulation of the EEAS’ tasks in relation to those of the High 
Representative, one must also be aware of the fact that Article 2 uses the 
words “as outlined, notably” in Articles 18 and 27 TEU. Two textual elements 
are relevant: on the one hand, the word mandates is plural; and second, the 
words “outlined” and “notably” indicate the open-ended nature of the HR’s 
mandate, and the fact that alongside Articles 18 and 27 TEU, other provisions 
may be relevant. One must therefore piece together the whole mandate of 
the HR from the Treaties, and thereby also substantively broaden the support 
tasks of the EEAS itself.  According to the TEU, the High Representative:  
 
“shall assist the President of the European Council”;
47
 “shall conduct the 
CFSP”;
48
 “shall be responsible within the Commission for responsibilities 
incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of 
the Union’s external action”;
49
 “shall ensure the unity, consistency and 
                                                             
 
45
 Interview with a Former Head of Delegation, 24 October 2012. 
 
46
 Cp. Case C-130/10 European Parliament v Council, judgment of 19 July 2012, nyr. 
 
47
 Article 15(6) penultimate paragraph, TEU. 
 
48
 Article 18(2) TEU. 
 
49
 Article 18(3) TEU. 
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effectiveness of action by the Union in the CFSP”;
50
 shall “put into effect the 
CFSP”;
51
 “shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council”;
52
 “shall contribute through 
his proposals towards the preparation of the CFSP”;
53
 “shall ensure 
implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the 
Council”;
54
 “shall represent the EU for matters related to the CFSP … shall 
conduct political dialogue on the Union’s behalf … shall express the Union’s 
position in international organizations”;
55
 and finally, she has an important 
role in CSDP decision-making.
56  
 
 Characteristic of the EEAS Decision is that not all information on any 
given issue is found in one article of the legal instrument.  As such, 
Article 4 (3) on the fashion in which the Central Administration of the 
EEAS shall be organised is crucial for a good understanding of the 
Service’s ’ tasks.  Indeed, with the limited substantive policy references 
in the EEAS’ support tasks, it must be acknowledged that much 
information on the EEAS’ policy work can be inferred from its 
organogram and the staff it has absorbed from the Council and 
Commission. Indeed, Article 4 (3) states that the EEAS shall have 
geographic DG’s covering all areas of the world, as well as thematically 
focused organisational sub-entities. 
 
   Evidently, having to interpret and define the substantive tasks of an 
organisation by looking at the fashion in which it is internally structured 
is putting the cart before the horse: institutional organisation and 
staffing should be organised in light of projected and clearly defined 
tasks, rather than the reverse. This problem can be glossed over in 
relation to the geographic desks of the EEAS. In this case they can be 
viewed as the logical consequence of the EEAS’ function to aid the 
HR/VP in ensuring coherence of EU external policy. This is also why, 
since the European Convention, a consensus emerged that no 
geographically organised units should exist in the Commission or 
                                                             
 
50
 Article 26(2) second indent TEU, together with the Council. 
 
51
 Article 26(3) TEU. 
 
52
 Articles 18(3) TEU and 27(1) TEU. 
 
53
 Articles 18(2) TEU and 27(1) TEU. 
 
54
 Article 27(1) TEU. 
 
55
 Article 27(2) TEU. 
 
56
 Article 42(4) TEU. 
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Council General Secretariat.57 The thematic desks are more 
problematic, as their substantive policy tasks are the result of the 2009-
2010 negotiation process and the tug-of-war over the competences of 
the EEAS and the Commission.  For example, the absence of a thematic 
desk on energy is the result of Commission efforts to avoid the EEAS 
siphoning in EU external energy policy, rather than a principled decision 
on whether or not such a desk would be useful for EU policy.58 Another 
example: the initial proposal for a thematic desk dealing with gender 
issues was due to the specific interest of the person holding the 
mandate of the HR/VP in this issue.  
 
 Apart from Article 4 EEAS Decision, certain other provisions in the EEAS 
legal instrument, such as Article 5(9) and (10), also contain a number of 
tasks which are not contained in Article 2.  They cannot be considered 
lex specialis provisions in relation to Article 2 of the Council Decision, 
but more additional tasks. This indeed seems to be a recurrent problem 
with the EEAS decision, namely: despite the fact that provisions are 
regrouped under ‘tasks’, ‘cooperation’, ‘nature and scope’, etc. one still 
finds provisions that could fall under either of these categories, in 
various other articles.  More generally, we must also look to other 
legal/non-legal sources to tease out the tasks of the EEAS:  
 
o the TEU describing the mandate of the HR/VP;  
 
o the debate and documents relating to which elements of the Council 
General Secretariat/Commission the EEAS would/has absorbed;  
 
o the organogram, in all its different iterations over the last 2 years, 
provides a source of information on the substantive tasks of the EEAS: 
the geographic scope of its work, as well as the thematic desks.  
 
o other documents such as the EEAS-Commission working arrangement 
of January 2012; and the Joint Decision on managing delegations of 
March 2012. 
 
                                                             
57
 See note 39, above. Although certain Commission DGs have since the advent of the EEAS begun to 
organise themselves around geographic scope, where this is “deemed necessary”. See report 
prepared for the AFET Committee of the European Parliament, The Organisation and Functioning of 
the EEAS: Achievements, Challenges and Opportunities, to be published end February 2013. 
58
 J. F. Braun, "EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules - Between a new policy and business 
as usual" (February 2011) CEPS Working Paper No 31, 4. 
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 A final consideration is the extent to which the mandate of the EEAS is 
circumscribed in an exhaustive fashion. Arguably, Article 2(1) allows it 
to be entrusted with tasks not explicitly mentioned in the articles it 
refers to, and that the European Council could entrust the HR and with 
that the EEAS with other tasks not explicitly provided for in the Treaty, 
the way the Commission has in the past been endowed with tasks not 
explicitly foreseen in primary law (e.g. management of the European 
Development Fund, or the conduct of the EU pre-accession strategy). 
In sum, Article 2 did not lay down the tasks of the EEAS in any solid, 
ascertainable fashion, though that is not necessarily problematic.  The 
question is then, to what extent it is necessary to do so in a potentially 
revised EEAS decision; and if so, whether this should be done in the Council 
Decision. The bigger question is then whether the current Treaty rules even 
allow for any such definition and deepening of the EEAS’ mandate. 
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ARTICLE 3 
Cooperation 
 
 
1. The EEAS shall support, and work in cooperation with, the diplomatic services of the Member States, 
as well as with the General Secretariat of the Council and the services of the Commission, in order to 
ensure consistency between the different areas of the Union’s external action and between those 
areas and its other policies.  
 
2. The EEAS and the services of the Commission shall consult each other on all matters relating to the 
external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions, except on matters covered by 
the CSDP. The EEAS shall take part in the preparatory work and procedures relating to acts to be 
prepared by the Commission in this area. 
This paragraph shall be implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU, and with 
Article 205 TFEU. 
 
3. The EEAS may enter into service-level arrangements with relevant services of the General 
Secretariat of the Council, the Commission, or other offices or interinstitutional bodies of the Union. 
 
4. The EEAS shall extend appropriate support and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of 
the Union, in particular to the European Parliament. The EEAS may also benefit from the support and 
cooperation of those institutions and bodies, including agencies, as appropriate. The EEAS internal 
auditor will cooperate with the internal auditor of the Commission to ensure a consistent audit policy, 
with particular reference to the Commission’s responsibility for operational expenditure. In addition, 
the EEAS shall cooperate with the European Anti-Fraud Office ("OLAF") in accordance with Regulation 
(EC) No 1073/1999. It shall, in particular, adopt without delay the decision required by that Regulation 
on the terms and conditions for internal investigations. As provided in that Regulation, both Member 
States, in accordance with national provisions, and the institutions shall give the necessary support to 
enable OLAF’s agents to fulfil their tasks. 
 
 
While Article 2 of the EEAS Decision predominantly purports to allocate “tasks” to 
the Service by reference to the functions of other EU external relations actors, 
Article 3 is entirely devoted to fostering cooperation among them (section 1). 
Generally, Article 3 is formulated in mandatory language. It thus establishes an 
obligation of cooperation that recalls the terminology of the TEU (Section 2). It is in 
turn expressed as various obligations of conduct involving procedural duties (Section 
3), whose scope of application is broad, particularly in terms of the number of actors 
to which they are addressed (Section 4). 
 
 
1. The rationale of cooperation in the EEAS decision 
 
 That an entire article of the EEAS Decision should be dedicated to cooperation is 
unsurprising for at least three reasons. First, it is essential for the very 
establishment of the EEAS, which according to Article 27(3) TEU, is based on the 
absorption and (partial) amalgamation of the relevant services and tasks of the 
Commission and of the General Secretariat of the Council, and on the 
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participation of member states’ diplomats. Second, cooperation appears all the 
more necessary since the allocation of “tasks” between the EEAS and others 
external relations players is vague,59 thus making power overlaps and frictions 
almost inevitable. Third, cooperation is instrumental to the coherence mandate 
of the HR/VP supported by the EEAS, given the essential function that such 
cooperation plays in ensuring coherence.60 Indeed, as a “Service” rather than a 
fully-fledged political institution, located between the Commission and the 
Council, the EEAS is primarily conceived to work for and with other actors, and 
thus needs the latter’s cooperation to effectively fulfil its tasks. 
 
 
2. A specific expression of the obligation of cooperation enshrined in the TEU  
 
 The cooperation foreseen in Article 3 is crafted as an obligation, as testified by 
the recurring usage of the phrase “shall” throughout the text.  
 
 Paragraph 1, which may be read as a chapeau of the whole article, recalls the 
function of cooperation as a means to ensure consistency. Indeed in referring to 
consistency and in emphasising its multifaceted application (viz. between 
different areas of the EU external action, and between those areas and other 
policies), the requirement evoked in Article 3 echoes the comprehensive 
coherence imperative set out in Article 21(3) TEU, of which it can thus be seen as 
a specific application. To be sure, the preamble of the EEAS Decision does make 
an explicit reference to Article 21(3) TEU in its second indent, immediately after 
the paragraph on the purpose of the measure. 
 
 The role of the EEAS in ascertaining overall consistency resonates in paragraph 2 
of Article 3 of the EEAS Decision, which underlines the duty of the Commission 
and the EEAS to consult on “all matters relating to the external action of the 
Union in the exercise of their respective functions” (emphasis added), except 
CSDP (see further below). The two shall thus consult each other not only on EU 
policies that are primarily external (e.g. trade, neighbourhood, development) but 
equally on all EU policies having an external dimension (e.g. environment, 
transport, climate change, energy). 
 
                                                             
59
 See discussion under Article 2 EEAS Decision, above. 
 
60
 On this connection, see e.g. C. Hillion, “Tous pour un, Un pour tous!  Coherence in the External 
relations of the European Union” in M. Cremona (ed.), Developments in EU External Relations Law, 
Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) pp. 10-36. 
More generally on coherence, see I. Bosse-Platière, L'article 3 du traité UE : Recherche sur une 
exigence de cohérence de l’action extérieure de l’Union européenne (Brussels : Bruylant, 2009). 
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 The terminology of cooperation used in Article 3 EEAS Decision also recalls the 
terms of Article 4(3) TEU establishing the principle of sincere cooperation 
between the member states and the EU, as well as the provisions of Article 13(2) 
TEU on inter-institutional cooperation. The obligation of cooperation between 
the EEAS and other actors of the EU external action thus arguably finds its 
ultimate foundations in the TEU, and could thereby be enforced accordingly.  
 
 In particular, while the EEAS Decision is of a CFSP nature, thereby limiting its 
enforceability given the circumscribed jurisdiction of the European Court of 
Justice in this area, the obligations it contains nonetheless ought to be conceived 
and possibly applied by reference to the constitutional principles and obligations 
they encapsulate, particularly where those are specifically articulated in 
subsequent documents, such as the Joint Decision of the Commission and the 
High Representative on Cooperation Mechanisms concerning the Management 
of Delegations of the European Union,61 or the “operational guidelines for the 
preparation and conduct of negotiations for framework agreements involving 
both the HR and the Commission”.62 According to the latter, the EEAS is expected 
to work in close cooperation with the services of the Commission when 
negotiating such comprehensive agreements (i.e. covering CFSP and non-CFSP 
dimensions) on behalf of the EU. These arrangements arguably “represent the 
fulfilment of [the] duty of cooperation”63 as expressed in Article 3 EEAS Decision 
and ultimately founded on Article 4(3) TEU.64 
 
 Indeed, akin to the duty of cooperation articulated by the European Court of 
Justice, Article 3 EEAS Decision points to several obligations of conduct. 
 
 
2. Cooperation as multiple obligations of conduct 
                                                             
61
 Joint Decision of the Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy on Cooperation Mechanisms concerning the Management of Delegations of the 
European Union; JOIN(2012)8, 28.3.2012. 
 
62
 “Operational guidelines for the preparation and conduct of negotiations for framework agreements 
with third countries involving both the European Commission and the High Representative of the 
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR)”, signed by the Secretary-General of the 
Commission and the Chief Operating Officer of the EEAS.  
 
63
 See in this regard, C-25/94 Commission v Council [1996] ECR I-1469. 
 
64
 Paragraph 6 of the preamble of the Joint Decision explicitly refers to Article 3(1) EEAS Decision, 
while its paragraph 1 evokes the need for the Commission and the EEAS “to collaborate closely” in 
view of the post-Lisbon EU “institutional set up in the external relations area”. In the same vein, the 
Guidelines mention that “These arrangements… are designed to ensure the full involvement of the 
Commission services and optimise cooperation with the EEAS”.  
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 The obligation of cooperation enshrined in Article 3 takes various expressions in 
the different paragraphs that compose it. It is formulated as duties to “support”, 
“work in cooperation with” (paragraph 1), “consult”, and “take part in 
preparatory work” (paragraph 2). Article 3 thus points to several more specific 
duties that remind of the obligations of conduct which the Court of Justice has 
derived from the principle of cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU.65  
 
 It should be noted that all the procedural duties are not absolute, as some 
appear to vary depending on the subject matter and/or the actor concerned. 
Hence, as suggested above, Article 3(1) should perhaps be read as introducing 
the obligation of cooperation as a general EEAS duty to “support and work in 
cooperation with” all actors involved, viz. the services of the Commission, the 
General Secretariat of the Council, the member states’ diplomatic services, and 
possibly “other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular the European 
Parliament” (Article 3(4)).66 Other paragraphs (as well as other provisions in the 
EEAS Decision) would by contrast establish special duties of consultation, 
participation and assistance, which would have a more specific and thus 
differentiated application.  
 
(i) Duty to assist and duty to support 
 
 The obligation of cooperation envisaged by the Decision seemingly makes a 
distinction between the duty to “support” and the duty to “assist”. For example, 
while the EEAS “shall support” the diplomatic services of the member states, the 
GSC and the services of the Commission (Article 3(1)), it “shall assist the 
President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, 
and the Commission in the exercise of their respective functions” (Article 2(2), 
                                                             
65
 See in particular: Case C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805; Case C-433/03 
Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985; Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (‘MOX plant’) [2006] 
ECR I-4635; Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (‘PFOS’), judgment of 20 April 2010, nyr; and more 
generally: M Cremona, “Defending the Community Interest: the Duties of Cooperation and 
Compliance” in M Cremona & B De Witte (eds.) EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional 
fundamentals (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2008) 125; E Neframi, “The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its 
Scope through its Application in the Field of EU External Relations” (2010) 47 Common Market Law 
Review 323; C Hillion, “Mixity and coherence in EU external relations: the significance of the duty of 
cooperation” in C Hillion and P Koutrakos (eds), Mixed Agreements Revisited – The Union and its 
Member States in the World (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010);  G De Baere, “O, Where is Faith? O, 
Where is Loyalty? Some Thoughts? On the Duty of Loyal Co-operation and the Union’s External 
Environmental Competences in the light of the PFOS Case” (2011) 36 European Law Review 405. 
66
 Article 3(1) could also be understood as establishing a specific duty of cooperation, involving 
procedural obligations of particular relevance to relations with the member states and the Council 
General Secretariat. For the Commission this would then be the lex generalis, while being subject to a 
lex specialis in the form of a duty of consultation in paragraph 2, specifically related to Article 21 TEU.  
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emphasis added), but it “shall support the [HR] in fulfilling his/her mandates”.67 
Other provisions of the Decision that appear to articulate the duty of 
cooperation also refer to the obligation to “assist” (e.g. Articles 2(2) and 10(3)).  
The question may thus be raised as to whether the two notions, “support” v 
“assist”, ought to be understood differently, in the sense of possibly generating 
distinct obligations of conduct. If so, the obligation of cooperation would take 
different forms depending on the actor with which the EEAS has to cooperate.  
 
 A look at other linguistic versions of the Decision may nuance the importance of 
such distinction. For instance, the French text appears to use the word  “assiste” 
both where the English refers to either “support” or “assist”.68 This would 
indicate that the notion could be used interchangeably. Indeed, the duty to 
“assist” is constitutive of the general principle of cooperation enshrined in 
Article 4(3) TEU. The latter notably foresees that pursuant to such principle, the 
Union and the member states, shall in full mutual respect, assist each other in 
carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaty. Thus in calling the EEAS generally 
to work in cooperation with other players, Article 3(1) implicitly encapsulates a 
duty to assist.  
 
(ii) Duty to consult  
 
 Article 3(2) establishes a specific obligation of consultation between the EEAS 
and the “services” (plural) of the Commission, on all matters relating to the 
external action of the Union in the exercise of their respective functions. As 
briefly evoked above, this entails that the Commission is deemed to consult the 
EEAS on all external aspects of internal policies too. Hence alongside trade, 
neighbourhood and development policies, for example, the Commission is 
supposed to consult the EEAS in exercising its own powers in the field of energy 
policy, environmental protection, justice and home affairs, insofar as these fields 
touch upon the external action of the Union.  
 
 Similarly, the EEAS has to consult the Commission services when exercising its 
functions, for instance in the context of international negotiations as referred to 
above, but also in supporting the HR in e.g. the conduct of political dialogue with 
third states. As the only express limitation in Article 3(2) to the obligation of 
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 Emphasis added. The same distinctions can be found in Article 2(2) EEAS Decision, see discussion 
above. 
 
68
 For instance, the first paragraph of Article 3 uses the word “assiste” in French, where the English 
version says “support”.  
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consultation of the Commission concerns the CSDP, it may be assumed that the 
EEAS shall consult the Commission on the non-CSDP dimension of the CFSP. 
 
 The duty to consult is explicitly addressed to the EEAS and the Commission. 
Article 3 does not evoke a possible application of such duty between the EEAS 
and the Council services or members states’ diplomatic services. The question 
may thus be raised as to whether this silence entails that such consultation is 
neither required, nor even envisaged. Arguably however, one may submit that 
the latter is implicit, and ultimately results from the duty of sincere cooperation 
imposed by primary law.  Indeed, Article 21(3) TEU foresees that the 
Commission and the Council cooperate to ensure consistency, assisted by the 
HR, him/herself assisted by the EEAS. Arguably, the ability of the HR and EEAS to 
fulfil this coherence-making task primarily depends on the cooperation that 
both the Commission and Council are able to provide.  
 
 (iii) Duty/right to take part 
 
 While the Commission is explicitly compelled to consult with the EEAS, Article 
3(2) also obliges it to involve the Service in preparatory work and procedures 
relating to acts it prepares in the area of EU external action.69 Thus, the 
cooperation obligation of Article 3 goes further than mere consultation as 
regards the Commission. It also entails participative rights of the EEAS in policy 
shaping in all areas of EU external action, thus including development, 
neighbourhood, and trade, but also in forging the external dimension of EU 
environment, transport, energy policies.70 This participation has already 
materialised in various ways (e.g. “Joint Communications”) and is sometimes 
required by the Treaty provisions (cf. Articles 215 and 222 TFEU).71 
                                                             
69
 Indeed, the phrase “this area” at the end of the sentence relates to the “external action of the 
Union” (cf proposal of Ashton), not the CSDP evoked in the previous sentence as a prima facie reading 
would suggest. The ambiguity comes from the fact that originally (i.e. in Ashton’s proposal of March 
2010), the preceding sentence did not contain the expression “except on matters covered by the 
CSDP”. 
 
70
 The practice is somewhat more nuanced, as regards energy policy for instance, see B Van Vooren, 
“Europe Unplugged: Progress, potential and limitations of EU external policy three years post-Lisbon” 
(2012) SIEPS Report 2012:5. 
 
71
 See e.g. Joint Communication Delivering on a New European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN(2012) 14 
15.5.2012; Joint Communication Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region: 
progress since 2008 and next steps, JOIN(2012) 19, 26.6.2012; Joint Communication EU Counter-
terrorism Action Plan for the Horn of Africa and Yemen, JOIN (2012) 24, 31.8.2012; Joint 
Communication Human Rights and Democracy at the Heart of EU External Action – Towards a more 
effective approach, COM(2011) 886 12.12.2011; Joint Communication Global Europe : A New 
Approach to financing EU external action Brussels, COM(2011) 865, 7.12.2011. 
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 The cooperation between the EEAS and the Commission, both in the form of 
consultation and preparatory collaboration is determined by a specific 
normative framework:  Article 3(2) foresees that “this paragraph shall be 
implemented in accordance with Chapter 1 of Title V of the TEU, and with Article 
205 TFEU” (emphasis added). Given that this Chapter 1 sets out the “general 
provisions of the Union’s external action”, it is somewhat surprising that the 
reference to this normative framework should only be made in the specific 
context of paragraph 2, as if the objectives and tasks it encapsulates were to be 
achieved only by the EEAS-Commission cooperation, and not by the member 
states and the General Secretariat of the Council. It is contended that all the 
activities of the EEAS and of other institutions too, and all their interactions 
within the EU system of external relations are legally determined by the 
“general provisions of the Union’s external action” set out in that Chapter 1.  
 
 
3. Scope of application of the obligation of cooperation  
 
(i) Cooperation with whom? 
 
 The first paragraph of Article 3 emphasises the duty of the EEAS to cooperate 
with the member states’ diplomatic services, with those of the Commission and 
with the General Secretariat of the Council. While the Service was deemed, 
through its initial composition, to incarnate the requested cooperation between 
previously competing Commission and Council services,72 this provision is an 
acknowledgement that the GSC and the Commission continue to play a key role in 
the external action of the Union – as do indeed the member states. 
 
 Indeed, it is noteworthy that the obligation referred to in Article 3(1) concerns in 
equal terms the member states’ diplomatic services, the General Secretariat of 
the Council and Commission services. This can be taken as an indication that the 
EEAS is equidistant from those three actors, at least in terms of obligation to 
cooperate.  
 
 The EEAS’ duty of cooperation is not limited to those actors mentioned in the first 
paragraphs. Article 2(2) envisages that the EEAS assists the presidents of the 
European Council and of the European Commission, respectively. As suggested 
above, the reference to “assist” rather than “support” ought not to be overrated.   
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 See Article 27(3) TEU; Article 6 EEAS Decision, as well as the Annex thereto. 
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 Moreover, Article 3(4) foresees that the EEAS “shall extend appropriate support 
and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union, in particular 
the European Parliament”. Indeed, Article 3(3) envisages possible inter-service 
arrangements not only with the Commission and the GSC, but also with “other 
offices or interinstitutional bodies of the Union”. In essence, the duty is of the 
same kind as the obligation to cooperate with other actors given that the 
provision refers to extending support and cooperation. Equally mandatory 
(“shall”), it is nonetheless expressed in more nuanced fashion by using the notion 
“appropriate”. In other words the support might not be as general and automatic 
as in the case of, e.g., the Commission, Council or member states services. The 
notion of appropriateness suggests that the cooperation might be decided by the 
EEAS itself, under the authority of the HR, on a case-by-case basis, taking account 
of the limited role of the EP in EU foreign policy. In practice however, the EP has 
found means to influence the behaviour of the EEAS and HR, and strengthen its 
commitment to provide information, to report to, as well as to consult with the 
EP.73  
 
 Recital 7 of the Preamble provides specific information as to the other bodies 
which the EEAS might be called to support: e.g. the European Defence Agency, 
the EU Satellite Centre, the EU Institute for Security Studies and the European 
Security and Defence College; on the ground that they all involve HR 
responsibilities. Apart from the European Parliament and these bodies, one may 
presume that the most obvious candidates for such extended cooperation would 
be the various EU agencies with an external remit (e.g. Frontex, Europol).  
 
 Cooperation between the EEAS and Commission services is also required at the 
level of EU Delegations, in view of the inclusion of Commission staff within the 
Delegations (Article 5 EEAS Decision). As evoked above, a Joint Decision of the 
Commission and the HR “on Cooperation mechanisms concerning the 
management of delegations of the European Union” has been adopted in March 
of 2012, which seemingly fulfils the duty of cooperation of Article 3, to which it 
explicitly refers. 
 
 Other provisions in the Decision envisage internal cooperation, among the 
different services of the EEAS. Hence, Article 4(3)(b) EEAS Decision emphasises 
that full coordination between all the structures of the EEAS “shall be ensured”. 
This is particularly important in view of the initial composition of the EEAS, but 
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 See, e.g., Declaration by the High Representative on Political Accountability, OJ 2010 C 210/1, and 
the Framework Agreement on Relations between the European Parliament and the European 
Commission, OJ 2010 L 304/47). 
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also considering the level of procedural and organisational differentiation that has 
been maintained in the creation of the EEAS, as evidenced in the last indent of 
Article 4(3)(a) EEAS Decision.74 
 
 Article 3(4) requires the EEAS to cooperate also with the EU Anti-Fraud Office, 
OLAF, an office set up by the Commission deemed to help it perform its duty to 
implement the budget.75 The provision includes a reference to Regulation 
1073/199976 about OLAF’s investigation powers, and the request that the EEAS 
adopt a decision on the terms and conditions for internal investigations. 
Cooperation is equally needed between the Commission and the EEAS respective 
internal auditors, with a view to ensure consistent audit policy.77 It should be 
noticed that this fourth paragraph was much leaner in HR /VP Ashton’s proposal 
of March 2010, which read as follows: “The EEAS shall extend appropriate support 
and cooperation to the other institutions and bodies of the Union”. 
 
 
(ii) Reciprocal cooperation? 
 
 The obligation of cooperation enshrined in Article 3 appears to operate only one 
way in the EEAS-member states diplomatic services nexus. Indeed, in contrast to 
earlier drafts, the Decision is mostly silent on a possible reverse member states’ 
duty of cooperation vis-à-vis the EEAS. Thus Article 5(9) EEAS Decision no longer 
expressly foresees that the Union delegation diplomatic services of the member 
states exchange information, on a reciprocal basis.78 Seemingly, only Article 
10(3) EEAS Decision requires assistance from member states, in the specific field 
of security.79 One may thus surmise that member states’ diplomatic services are 
mostly free from any obligation towards the services of the EEAS. 
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 See discussion on Article 4, below. 
 
75
 In this respect, see Case C-11/00 Commission v ECB [2003) ECR I-7215.  
 
76
 Regulation (EC) no 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 may 1999 
concerning investigations conducted by the European anti-fraud office (Olaf) [OJ 1999 L 136/1]. 
 
77
 See the discussion under Article 8, below; and Case T-395/11 Elti d.o.o v Delegation of the European 
Union to Montenegro, Judgment of 4 June 2012, nyr. 
 
78
 Ashton’s proposal of March 2010 read as follows: “The Union delegations shall work in close 
cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States. They shall, on a reciprocal basis, 
provide all relevant information” (emphasis added).  
79
 See further discussion under Article 10 EEAS Decision, below.  
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 It may nevertheless be argued that the duty of cooperation mutually applies to 
the EEAS and the member states. The provisions of Article 4(3) TEU on sincere 
cooperation entail that the member states cooperate with the EEAS in fulfilling 
its tasks, akin to the cooperation member states are expected to show in 
relation to the Commission in other areas. One could for instance expect 
national Ministries of Foreign Affairs to consult with the relevant EEAS services 
before taking initiatives in relation to a third country with which the EU is in the 
process of forging new ties, especially if the EEAS has been entrusted with the 
negotiations of a comprehensive agreement with that country.80 At the very 
least, the cooperation of member states is required in organisational terms to 
ensure the smooth functioning of the EEAS, given the national element of its 
composition.81 Incidentally, the EEAS Decision provision on the cooperation 
between Union delegations and member states’ diplomatic services, evoked 
above, does not seem to exclude reciprocity entirely as regards transmission of 
information. Article 5(9) foresees that Union delegations “share information 
with the diplomatic services of the Member States” rather than “share their 
information with”.82 
 
 The GSC is not explicitly covered by the mutual obligation of cooperation set out 
in Article 3(2) either. Does this entail that only the Commission is subject to an 
obligation of consultation with the EEAS? Arguably, such a silence could be 
explained by the fact that, first, the GSC is not a policy initiator as the 
Commission is, and second, all relevant services of the GSC that have been 
involved in external action in the past have in principle been transferred to the 
EEAS. In practice however, the GSC is not disconnected from policy-making in 
the external sphere. Indeed, various units in the GSC continue to deal 
specifically with external relations,83 while several preparatory bodies in the 
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 As envisaged in the “Guidelines” mentioned above. In this situation, the obligations of conduct, 
evoked by the Court in cases such as C-266/03 Commission v Luxembourg [2005] ECR I-4805; Case C-
433/03 Commission v Germany [2005] ECR I-6985Case C-459/03 Commission v Ireland (‘MOX plant’) 
[2006] ECR I-4635; Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (‘PFOS’) (Judgment of 20 April 2010, nyr), 
could be applicable mutatis mutandis in relation to the EEAS. 
 
81
 In the same vein, Article 13(1) EEAS Decision foresees that both the HR and the Council (as well as 
the Commission and the member states) are responsible for implementing the decision, it also says 
that they “shall take all measures necessary in furtherance thereof”. 
 
82
 Similarly, the French version of Article 5(9) says “échangent des informations avec les services 
diplomatiques des États membres”; rather than “échangent leurs informations”. Indeed, the word 
“échangent” suggests a two way process, as could the phrase ”share”. 
 
83
 Directorate General C of the GSC deals with “Foreign Affairs, Enlargement and civil protection” 
comprising Directorate 1 - Trade, Development, EU–ACP relations; Directorate 2 - Enlargement, 
Europe (non-EU), Foreign Affairs Council Support and Directorate 3 - Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection. 
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Council, working for the FAC, are not chaired by EEAS staff, but by the rotating 
presidency of the Council thus helped by the GSC.84 It is indeed noteworthy that 
at no point is the Council Presidency mentioned in the EEAS Decision, notably as 
regards the duty of cooperation, despite the latter’s involvement in the external 
action of the Union post-Lisbon.85 
 
 It is thus contended that the obligation of cooperation also operates in relation 
to the Council services, at least to allow the EEAS to fulfil its key consistency-
seeking function. Support for this can be found in Article 3(3) which opens the 
possibility for the EEAS to conclude inter-services arrangements, to specify the 
desired cooperation not only with the services of the Commission, but also with 
those of the Council.86 Arguably, this provision would not have much sense if 
there were no GSC duty to cooperate with the EEAS. Moreover, Article 4(5) EEAS 
Decision explicitly foresees that the HR and the EEAS shall be assisted where 
necessary by the General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant 
departments of the Commission. Here too, the Decision evokes the possibility of 
inter-services arrangements to specify such assistance. Incidentally, one may   
wonder why this provision was not included in Article 3. 
  
 More generally, one could invoke the Treaty provisions on sincere cooperation, 
namely Article 4(3) TEU to fill the gaps of Article 3 EEAS. Hence, despite the 
silence of Article 3 EEAS, the Council, including all its services, being subject to 
an obligation of cooperation with other institutions under Article 13(2) TEU, 
should by extension cooperate with the EEAS, notably when the latter performs 
functions on behalf of, or which were previously performed by the Commission. 
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 For instance: the Working Party of Foreign Relations Counsellors (RELEX), the Working Party on 
Terrorism (International Aspects) (COTER), the Working Party on the application of specific measures 
to combat terrorism (COCOP), the Working Party on Consular Affairs (COCON), the Working Party on 
Public International Law (COJUR), and the Working Party on the Law of the Sea (COMAR), the ACP 
Working Party, the Working Party on Development Cooperation (DEVGEN), the Working Party on 
EFTA, the Working Party on Dual-Use Goods, the Working Party on Trade Questions, the Working 
Party on Commodities, the Working Party on the Generalised System of Preferences, the  Working 
Party on Preparation for International Development Conferences/UNCCD Desertification/UNCTAD, 
the Working Party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid ; see Council Decision 2009/908/EU of 
1 December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the European Council Decision on 
the exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the 
Council, OJ 2009 L 322/28. 
 
85
 See Editorial Comments, “The post-Lisbon institutional package: Do old habits die hard?” (2010) 47 
CMLRev 597. 
 
86
 Indeed, Article 3(3) mentions the GSC before the Commission for possible service-level 
arrangements, while the Ashton proposal put the Commission first, before the GSC.  To our 
knowledge, no such service arrangement has yet been agreed between the GSC and the EEAS. 
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It would be surprising that, as a result of the transfer of Commission functions to 
the EEAS, notably to fulfil the consistency objective of the Treaty makers, the 
cooperative duties of the Council would diminish.  
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ARTICLE 4  
Central administration of the EEAS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The EEAS shall be managed by an Executive Secretary-General who will operate under the authority of the 
High Representative. The Executive Secretary-General shall take all measures necessary to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the EEAS, including its administrative and budgetary management. The Executive Secretary-
General shall ensure effective coordination between all departments in the central administration as well as 
with the Union Delegations. 
2. The Executive Secretary-General shall be assisted by two Deputy Secretaries-General. 
3. The central administration of the EEAS shall be organised in directorates-general. 
(a) It shall, in particular, include: 
— a number of directorates-general comprising geographic desks covering all countries and regions of the 
world, as well as multilateral and thematic desks. These departments shall coordinate as necessary with the 
General Secretariat of the Council and with the relevant services of the Commission, 
— a directorate-general for administrative, staffing, budgetary, security and communication and information 
system matters, working in the EEAS framework managed by the Executive Secretary-General. The High 
Representative shall appoint, in accordance with the normal rules of recruitment, a Director-General for 
budget and administration who shall work under the authority of the High Representative. He/she shall be 
responsible to the High Representative for the administrative and internal budgetary management of the 
EEAS. He/she shall follow the same budget lines and administrative rules as are applicable in the part of 
Section III of the Union’s budget which falls under Heading 5 of the Multiannual Financial Framework,  
— the crisis management and planning directorate, the civilian planning and conduct capability, the 
European Union Military Staff and the European Union Situation Centre, placed under the direct authority 
and responsibility of the High Representative, and which shall assist him/her in the task of conducting the 
Union’s CFSP in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty while respecting, in accordance with Article 40 
TEU, the other competences of the Union. 
The specificities of these structures, as well as the particularities of their functions, recruitment and the status 
of the staff shall be respected. 
Full coordination between all the structures of the EEAS shall be ensured. 
(b) The central administration of the EEAS shall also include: 
— a strategic policy planning department, 
— a legal department under the administrative authority of the Executive Secretary-General which shall work 
closely with the Legal Services of the Council and of the Commission, 
— departments for interinstitutional relations, information and public diplomacy, internal audit and 
inspections, and personal data protection. 
4. The High Representative shall designate the chairpersons of Council preparatory bodies that are chaired by 
a representative of the High Representative, including the chair of the Political and Security Committee, in 
accordance with the detailed arrangements set out in Annex II to Council Decision 2009/908/EU of 1 
December 2009 laying down measures for the implementation of the European Council Decision on the 
exercise of the Presidency of the Council, and on the chairmanship of preparatory bodies of the Council. 
5. The High Representative and the EEAS shall be assisted where necessary by the General Secretariat of the 
Council and the relevant departments of the Commission. Service-level arrangements may be drawn up to 
that effect by the EEAS, the General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant Commission departments. 
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The principal aim of Article 4 is to set out the key management and administrative 
bodies responsible for the everyday running of the Service. In the following, both the 
basic shape of the EEAS (1) and the specific roles and functions of the Executive 
Secretary-General and Director-General for budget and administration (2), the 
geographical, thematic and multilateral desks (3), the crisis management structures 
(4), the departments (5) and Council working parties (6) are discussed.   
1. Basic shape of the Service 
 
 
 It will be recalled that Article 27(3) TEU sketches out only the basic aspects of the 
EEAS, including its mandate (to assist the High Representative) and its 
composition (the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council, 
the Commission and staff seconded from the national diplomatic services of the 
Member States). 
 
 Article 1(4) of the Council decision specifies that the EEAS shall be made up of a 
“central administration” and of “Union delegations to third countries and to 
international organisations”. It is also worth noting that the terminology used in 
the EEAS differs from that commonly found in the EU institutions (Managing 
Directors instead of Director-Generals, Divisions instead of Directorates-General, 
as well as the presence of a Corporate Board). 
 
 The basic shape of the Service had, however, been outlined in a number of 
preparatory documents. The Joint Progress Report of Solana and Barroso of 9 
June 2005 indicated an expansive Service comprising “geographical desks which 
cover all countries/regions of the world”. Alongside these there should be a 
number of “single thematic desks”87 focusing on issues such as “human rights, 
counter-terrorism, non-proliferation and relations with international 
organisations such as the UN”.88 
  
 Even at this early stage, the Joint Progress Report raised prescient questions 
regarding the central administration of the EEAS. These included how it would be 
possible to have a single ‘tableau d'effectifs’ when drawing staff from three 
sources; how the High Representative, as the highest appointing authority, can be 
responsible for recruitment on the basis of merit, while ensuring that “staff are 
recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis”; how to reflect specific 
EEAS requirements in the Staff Regulations, and how to meet the administrative 
costs of the EEAS while retaining a level of autonomy.89 
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 Joint Progress Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on the 
European External Action Service, 9956/05, Brussels, 9 June 2005, para. 13. 
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Joint Progress Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on the 
European External Action Service, 9956/05, Brussels, 9 June 2005, para. 14. 
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 Ibid. para. 21. 
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 The Swedish Presidency Report to the European Council on the EEAS of October 
2009 briefly mentioned the need for EEAS to have a limited number of support 
functions, “in particular, IT, management of human resources. The EEAS will need 
a small capacity for specific legal advice within its structure”.90 For the purpose of 
cost-efficiency, the report recommended that the High Representative and the 
EEAS be able to draw on “other services within both the Commission and the 
General Secretariat of the Council in order to fulfil his/her mandate”.91 
 
 Due to the multiple roles performed by the HR/VP, as well as the need to 
personally attend meetings in both Brussels and abroad, the importance of 
delegation has been widely recognised. The European Parliament advocated the 
establishment of three deputies in charge of multilateral, bilateral and crisis 
management.92 The EEAS Decision does not contain any provisions for the 
nomination of Deputies, but it was suggested that Article 33 TEU allowing 
nomination of special representatives, could provide a legal basis for such 
nomination. It is still questionable whether the role of the HR/VP could be truly 
‘deputised’ in the sense of allowing another individual to fulfil the role of the 
HR/VP, such as chairing the Foreign Affairs Council without a specific legal basis 
for such a role. 
 
 The lack of any formal deputisation (the formal delegation of authority) for the 
High Representative in either the Lisbon Treaty (Article 18 TEU) or the Council 
decision is surprising given the attention to the issue in the Convention on the 
Future of Europe and the fact that Article 17.6c TEU and Article 25 of the 
Commission’s Rules of Procedure clearly envisage deputisation for the President 
of the Commission. The complexity of deputising for the HR/VP in all of her 
various roles (Commission, Foreign Affairs Council, European Parliament and 
external representation) has created slightly different challenges. For the 
European Parliament, deputisation is carried out in accordance with the 
Declaration on Political Accountability (8 July 2010), an Inter-Institutional 
Agreement between the Parliament and Commission and the Rules of Procedure 
of the Council. Namely, a Commissioner will replace her for issues falling 
exclusively or primarily under Commission competences or, for those issues 
falling under CFSP, the rotating Presidency or one of the two relevant ministers of 
the ‘trio Presidency’. In the case of the Commission the absent member can be 
represented by the appropriate Chef de Cabinet, but with no voting rights or 
other rights beyond expressing the absent Commissioner’s position. In the case of 
the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Minister of the rotating Presidency can be 
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invited to chair in the absence of the High Representative.. For external 
representation and dialogues the HR/VP is, when necessary, represented by the 
rotating Presidency with a Commissioner (normally Stabilisation and Association 
and Cooperation Council meetings). In those cases where the rotating Presidency 
is unable to replace the HR/VP, an appropriate ministerial representative from 
another member state may be invited. 
 
 The article also makes provision for two Deputy Secretaries-General (para. 2). 
One addresses Political Affairs while the other concentrates on Inter-Institutional 
affairs. Along with the High Representative and the Executive Secretary-General, 
the four constitute the Corporate Board of the EEAS. Since the two Deputies are 
charged with ‘assisting the Executive Secretary-General’ their roles should 
therefore be understood in terms of ensuring effective coordination between all 
departments and with the delegations.  
 
2. Executive Secretary-General and Director-General for budget and 
administration 
 
 The original draft decision of 25 March 2010 (‘the March draft decision’) did not 
mention the Director-General for budget and administration. These aspects fell 
under the ‘Secretary-General’. The revised draft decision following the 21 June 
2010 Quadrilogue (‘the June draft decision’) showed clear concern from the 
European Parliament’s perspective regarding the budgetary aspects of the 
Service. This reflected in the post-quadrilogue draft of Article 4, which introduced 
the post of “Director General for budget and administration who shall work under 
the authority of the High Representative” and who, in this capacity, is responsible 
for the administrative and budgetary management of the EEAS. Mention of this 
post was included in a statement given by the HR, mentioning that the incumbent 
would be a “senior figure in the EEAS with proven experience of EU budget and 
administration”.93 
 
 The role of the Secretary-General was also altered to reflect management 
responsibilities for administrative, staffing, budgetary, security and 
communication and information systems94 – rather than the attribution of ‘direct 
authority’ in the March draft decision.95 Compared to the March draft decision 
the Secretary-General became an ‘Executive Secretary-General’. In addition to his 
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coordination role, the March draft decision also mentioned that he shall 
“represent the EEAS”. Under the EEAS Decision the role of the Executive 
Secretary-General omits this broader representative function, limiting the post-
holder to responsibility for the “smooth functioning” of the EEAS. The original 
intention was therefore to assist in the need to delegate certain representative 
functions of the HR to the Executive Secretary-General. 
 
 The subsequent drafts of the Council decision clearly illustrate the shifting role of 
the Executive Secretary-General and the insertion of the Director-General for 
budget and administration, largely at the behest of the European Parliament. The 
EEAS Decision reflects both of these changes but, by so doing, it introduces 
significant elements of ambiguity regarding the role of the Executive Secretary-
General and the relationship between this post and that of the Director-General 
for budget and administration.  Since the former is responsible for “all measures” 
necessary for the smooth functioning of the Service, including the administrative 
and budgetary measures, it is noteworthy that the latter works “under the 
authority of the High Representative” and not, as might be anticipated, the 
Executive Secretary-General. This is most likely because legal responsibility for 
budgetary and personnel matters resides with the HR and, with this in mind, 
reporting on these issues goes directly to the HR.  
 
3. Geographical, thematic and multilateral desks 
 
 In paragraph 3, mention is made of both geographical and thematic desks. The 
former is more obvious, based upon the transferral of the desks from the 
Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council (these are laid out in the 
Annex to the EEAS Decision). A limited impression of the latter can be gleaned by 
reading through the annex. It was evident prior to the creation of the Service that 
certain areas like climate change (see first organogram of the EEAS accompanying 
the March draft decision) were contested in terms of competences. The result is 
that the thematic areas covered apparently exclude some global issues that are 
important in terms of EU policy, such as climate change or energy security. There 
is also little guidance in the Decision as to how the thematic and geographic desks 
should inter-relate. The horizontal thematic desks can offer support to geographic 
desks on a wide range of issues including human rights and democracy, counter-
terrorism and non-proliferation, however this requires co-ordination between the 
thematic and geographic desks. 
 
 It was agreed that the thematic and geographic desks should not be duplicated 
within the Commission or Council General Secretariat, taking into account the 
Commission DGs’ roles in enlargement, humanitarian aid, trade, and 
development policy. 
 
4. Crisis management structures 
 
 The provisions on the crisis management bodies (CMPD, CPCC, EUMS, EU 
Situation Centre) make them work under the authority and responsibility of the 
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HR. The travaux préparatoires indicate sensitivity about the role of these bodies, 
with the Swedish Presidency report noting the need to take “full account of the 
specificities of these structures and preserving their particular functions, 
procedures and staffing conditions”.96  The ambiguous position of the crisis 
management bodies was reinforced by some of the member states. For instance, 
Slovakia recommended that “ESDP and crisis management should stay out of the 
EEAS (definitely at the beginning)”.97 Although this view did not prevail, the sense 
of separateness and the specific link to the HR was reflected in Ashton’s ‘Step 
Change’ paper. 98  Belgium, although in favour of the integration of these 
structures into the Service, wanted “to preserve their specificity as a single 
Directorate General, under direct authority of and direct access to the High 
Representative”. 99  The Finnish government saw the inclusion of the crisis 
response and the crisis management tasks within the EEAS as a “major structural 
improvement”.100 The formulations of the October 2009 Swedish Presidency 
report, as well as some positions of member states, were reflected in both the 
draft decision and the final version. Hence, mention is made of the “specificities” 
and “particularities” of the crisis management bodies mentioned (all of which 
were formerly in the General Secretariat of the Council). The challenge is to be 
found in the following sentence of the EEAS Decision, which states that “[f]ull 
coordination between all the structures of the EEAS shall be ensured”. 
 
 The stipulations regarding the crisis management bodies are framed in 
accordance with Article 40 TEU and, by reference, to Articles 3-6 TFEU. The 
presence of such references serves to remind the reader of the still partially 
pillarised nature of the Union and, more specifically, that the attainment of any 
comprehensive security approach should be mindful of the other related areas 
partially or exclusively falling under the Commission’s competences (crisis 
prevention; civil protection; post-conflict stabilisation; security sector reform etc). 
More specifically, the lack of linkage, other than through the HR, between the 
crisis management bodies mentioned in this paragraph and other parts of the 
Service having a more general crisis response function implies that there are 
challenges to ‘coordination’ and potentially to the ‘smooth functioning of the 
EEAS’ (see above), which raises legitimate questions about the soft nature of 
these stipulations. It is also worth noting that the reference in the text of the 
Council decision to the EU Situation Centre is incorrect since it has since been 
renamed the Intelligence and Analysis Centre (IntCen).  
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5. Departments 
 
 Article 4 of the EEAS Decision mentions a number of specific departments to be 
included in the EEAS central administration. These include a department for 
strategic policy planning, departments for inter-institutional relations, 
information and public diplomacy, internal audit and inspections, personal data 
protection, as well as a legal department. The EEAS legal department remains 
relatively small, and is to work closely with the Legal Services of the Council and 
Commission. A policy planning department is responsible for longer term and 
strategic planning of the EEAS, and should be in constant dialogue with the 
thematic and geographic desks. The EEAS Decision builds upon Ashton’s ‘Step 
Change’ document where she stressed that a 21st century external service 
required a professional communications structure, a substantive media operation 
to manage dialogues with NGOs, civil society, non-state actors, and other 
interested parties.101 
 
 Most of the suggested departments subsequently materialised in the EEAS 
although, surprisingly, public diplomacy was placed in the Foreign Policy 
Instrument (FPI) (alongside election observation, which also appears under 
Human Rights and Democracy in the Global and Multilateral Issues division), 
which has a particular status vis-à-vis the EEAS but which is not touched upon in 
this article. The clear intent of this paragraph was to place this function within the 
‘central administration’ of the EEAS. It is arguable whether this has been done in 
practice, especially bearing in mind that public diplomacy goes beyond strategic 
communication. 
 
6. Council working parties 
 
 The stipulation in paragraph 5 that the High Representative and the EEAS shall be 
assisted by the General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant departments 
of the Commission, relates to the Preamble (Para. 3) since any assistance has to 
be understood in the context of the ’normal tasks’ of the Council Secretariat and 
the Commission. Article 3(2) creates an obligation of mutual assistance in the 
context of the Commission but not the Council Secretariat.102 
 
 The Decision also expressly refers to chairing arrangements of the Council’s 
preparatory bodies. This was necessary due to the changes introduced to the 
rotating Presidency by the Lisbon Treaty.103 Article 4(4) stipulates that the High 
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Representative “shall designate the chairpersons of Council preparatory bodies 
that are chaired by a representative of the High Representative, including the 
chair of the Political and Security Committee, in accordance with the detailed 
arrangements set out in Annex II to the Council Decision concerned.”104 
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ARTICLE 5 
Union Delegations 
 
1. The decision to open or close a delegation shall be adopted by the High Representative, in 
agreement with the Council and the Commission. 
2. Each Union Delegation shall be placed under the authority of a Head of Delegation. 
The Head of Delegation shall have authority over all staff in the delegation, whatever their status, and 
for all its activities. He/she shall be accountable to the High Representative for the overall 
management of the work of the delegation and for ensuring the coordination of all actions of the 
Union. 
Staff in delegations shall comprise EEAS staff and, where appropriate for the implementation of the 
Union budget and Union policies other than those under the remit of the EEAS, Commission staff. 
3. The Head of Delegation shall receive instructions from the High Representative and the EEAS, and 
shall be responsible for their execution. 
In areas where the Commission exercises the powers conferred upon it by the Treaties, the 
Commission may, in accordance with Article 221(2) TFEU, also issue instructions to delegations, which 
shall be executed under the overall responsibility of the Head of Delegation. 
4. The Head of Delegation shall implement operational credits in relation to the Union’s projects in the 
corresponding third country, where sub-delegated by the Commission, in accordance with the 
Financial Regulation. 
5. The operation of each delegation shall be periodically evaluated by the Executive Secretary-General 
of the EEAS; evaluation shall include financial and administrative audits. For this purpose, the 
Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS may request assistance from the relevant Commission 
departments. In addition to internal measures by the EEAS, OLAF shall exercise its powers, notably by 
conducting anti-fraud measures, in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999. 
6. The High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the host country, the 
international organisation, or the third country concerned. In particular, the High Representative shall 
take the necessary measures to ensure that host States grant the Union delegations, their staff and 
their property, privileges and immunities equivalent to those referred to in the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961. 
7. Union delegations shall have the capacity to respond to the needs of other institutions of the Union, 
in particular the European Parliament, in their contacts with the international organisations or third 
countries to which the delegations are accredited. 
8. The Head of Delegation shall have the power to represent the Union in the country where the 
delegation is accredited, in particular for the conclusion of contracts, and as a party to legal 
proceedings. 
9. The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic 
services of the Member States. 
10. The Union delegations shall, acting in accordance with the third paragraph of Article 35 TEU, and 
upon request by Member States, support the Member States in their diplomatic relations and in their 
role of providing consular protection to citizens of the Union in third countries on a resource-neutral 
basis. 
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The establishment of Union delegations is a major innovation of the Lisbon Treaty (1). 
The purpose of Article 5 of the EEAS Decision is to articulate their operation. In 
commenting this article, the exchange of information with and between the member 
states will be discussed (2), the role and functions of the Head of Delegation (3), the 
status of Delegations in third states and at international organisations (4), and 
Delegations’ (potential) role in diplomatic and consular protection (5). 
 
1. A single diplomatic presence 
 
 The pivotal role in external representation by EU delegations finds its basis in 
Article 221(1) TFEU, which was newly inserted with the Lisbon Treaty: “Union 
delegations in third countries and at international organisations shall represent 
the Union.” The ambition flowing from this new provision in the TFEU is quite 
clear: the Union no longer wishes to have an international presence through 
delegations of only one of its institutions (e.g. Commission Delegations), or 
through the diplomats of the member state holding the rotating Presidency.105 
The purpose of this Treaty provision was to have “less Europeans and more 
EU”106, a single diplomatic presence for the Union speaking on behalf of a single 
legal entity active globally. Implementing this ambition has meant that the former 
‘Commission Delegations’ have been turned into ‘Union delegations’107 and that 
for all practical diplomatic purposes they are seen as EU ‘embassies’.108  
 
 Given the objective of a single diplomatic presence, it is striking that the Special 
Representatives are not mentioned in Article 5 of the Decision. Still, the European 
Union currently has eleven Special Representatives (EUSRs) in different countries 
and regions of the world. They support the work of the High Representative and 
form part of the EEAS external machinery. 
 
 In a joint letter of 3 March 2010 from Foreign Ministers Bildt of Sweden and 
Miliband of the UK to High Representative Ashton, it was nevertheless stressed 
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that the EEAS will need an “intimate relationship with its principal stakeholders in 
the rest of the Commission, but it must have the keys to its own house”.109 
 
 According to Article 5(1), the High Representative is responsible for opening or 
closing delegations. He/she does so in agreement with the Council and the 
Commission. Given the fact that the former delegations were part of the 
Commission, this is a major innovation. Opening a mission in a foreign state and 
thereby institutionalising diplomatic relations with that state is a fundamental 
step in international law. It is an important power vested in the High 
Representative, but the Commission and the Council must concur. This raises the 
question what possibilities the High Representative has when one of the latter, or 
both, do not agree. The decision to send an envoy or set up a less prestigious type 
of presence, such as an ‘office’, is not made dependent on their agreement. 
 
 The facilities offered by the Union Delegations are not just at the service of the 
EEAS itself and the Commission, but also of other institutions. As Article 5(7) 
refers to “institutions of the Union”, it is clear that it applies to the formal 
institutions listed in Article 13(1) TEU (European Parliament, European Council, 
Council, European Commission, Court of Justice, European Central Bank, Court of 
Auditors). It could be submitted, though, that other EU bodies may also want to 
rely on Delegations to ‘respond to their needs’ in their contacts with third states 
and international organisations. This submission is supported by the provisions of 
Art 3(4) of the EEAS Decision about the mandatory extension of EEAS’ 
”appropriate support to the other institutions and bodies of the Union”. The 
latter’s formulation is general: the EEAS is envisaged as a whole, i.e. including 
central administration and delegations. The idea is to have Delegations function 
as a portal for the EU and it makes sense not to limit the quest for consistency on 
the basis of formal rules. The European Parliament is mentioned explicitly. While 
this is legally not necessary, the reason may be to ensure specifically that for visits 
abroad MEPs can also rely on the services of the Delegations. 
 
 In terms of evaluation, the Delegations are covered by the same rules as other EU 
bodies (Article 5(5)). A similar provision is not included for the EEAS as such, 
although Article 3(4) does refer to specific inspections by OLAF. 
 
 
2. Exchange of information between the Union Delegations and Member States 
 
 Article 5(9) of the Council Decision obliges Union Delegations to work in close 
cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the member 
states. While the March draft decision imposed a reciprocal obligation to share 
information, the EEAS Decision only refers to the Delegations and their obligation 
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to share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States. The 
question is whether this would imply that member states are not under any 
obligation to share information with Union Delegations. Pursuant to the principle 
of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), the loyalty obligation (Article 24(3) TEU) 
as well as the specific obligation of the diplomatic missions of the member states 
and the Union delegations to cooperate (Article 32(3) TEU), this cannot, in our 
view, be the correct interpretation. As to the EEAS-Commission relationship, one 
must again look at the Working Arrangements of January 2012, which states the 
following concerning reporting back to headquarters:  
 
EU Delegations shall provide political reporting to the HR/VP, President Barroso and 
relevant Commissioner(s), the EEAS and Commission services …A two way flow of 
information is essential - from the political and trade/economic sections of EU Delegations 
to the EEAS and Commission services and in the opposite direction. The geographical desks 
in the EEAS shall be systematically copied on all reports and information relative to her/his 
respective country. Delegations shall provide relevant reporting to other Commission 
services outside the external relations ‘family’. The Commission services shall keep EU 
Delegations informed about relevant developments, providing lines to take etc.
110
 
 
However, the challenge of political reporting is less one between the institutions 
themselves than one between the EU Delegations and the member states.  At 
present the member states are mainly on the receiving end of EU Delegations’ 
reports, but share very little in the other direction. There is the hope and 
expectation that this will change as member states diplomatic representations 
come to trust and get used to their EU counterparts.111 
 
 
3. Head of Delegation 
 
 Pursuant to Article 5(2) of the Council Decision, the Head of Delegation shall have 
authority over all staff in the delegation and is accountable to the High 
Representative. Heads of Delegations de facto act as ‘EU Ambassadors’.112 The EU 
Heads of Delegations representing the Union in third states and at international 
organisations are thus conferred the authority to perform functions equivalent to 
those of national diplomats. It is interesting to note that s/he has authority over 
all staff, irrespective of their briefs. This implies that the Head of Delegation has 
overall authority, even on dossiers that were not primarily prepared by the EEAS, 
but by the Commission. Furthermore, s/he shall be accountable to the High 
Representative in all cases, and not to any of the Commissioners. 
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 The Head of Delegation shall receive instructions from the High Representative 
and the EEAS, and shall be responsible for their execution (Art. 5(3) of the Council 
Decision).  
 
 During the negotiations on setting up the EEAS questions arose from some of the 
member states wanting to see ‘appropriate’ involvement of the Commission but 
with ‘all instructions to the delegations’ flowing through the HR and the EEAS to 
HoDs.113 Arguably, the formulation of Article 5(3) of the Council Decision does not 
prevent the Commission from issuing instructions to delegations in areas 
belonging to its competences, but these shall also be executed under the overall 
responsibility of the Head of Delegation. The 2012 Working Arrangements 
between the Commission and the EEAS refer to the situation where the 
Commission, through the Head of Delegation, calls on EU Delegations to carry out 
activities related to policy implementation, demarches and policy advocacy on 
issues of Commission competences (e.g. trade, humanitarian affairs, etc.).114 The 
reference in Article 5(3) to Article 221(2) TFEU serves as a reminder that the 
Treaty itself has placed “Union delegations […] under the authority of the High 
Representative”. The general authority of the Head of Delegation, together with 
the overall responsibility to execute all instructions is meant to strengthen the 
consistency of the EU’s policies in a particular third state or at an international 
organisation. 
 
 The authority and responsibility of the Head of Delegation extends to the 
implementation of the financial dimensions of projects in third countries, as s/he 
shall implement the operational credits.115  In this context, the Head of Delegation 
might be acting on behalf of the Commission.116  
 
 The EU enjoys international legal personality, which allows it to enter into legal 
relations with states and other international organisations.117 Article 5(8) of the 
Council Decision allows the Union to be legally represented by the Head of 
Delegation in the country where the Delegation is accredited. The provision 
explicitly refers to the conclusion of contracts, and the role of the Head of 
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Delegation as a party to legal proceedings, 118 but this is not to be seen as a 
limitative list. In this context, the question arises whether a Head of Delegation 
could initial international agreements on behalf of the Union; that would 
obviously require adherence to the provisions of the treaty-making procedure of 
Article 218 TFEU.  
 
 
4. Status of Delegations in third states and at international organisations 
 
 The EU is obviously not a state. Yet, it is an active participant in the diplomatic 
network of states that is – primarily ‒ regulated by the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 1961 (‘VCDR’). Not being a party to the VCDR, the Union 
has developed a steady practice to opt in to its application in a contractual 
manner, typically through the conclusion of an establishment agreement or 
headquarters agreement. 119  Article 5(6) of the Council Decision foresees 
“arrangements” to do exactly this. Although the text refers to “arrangements” 
and “measures”, in practice an international agreement will be concluded with 
the host state or the international organisation concerned, in which diplomatic 
privileges and immunities are procured. 
 
 The fact that the international rules on diplomatic (and consular) relations were 
drafted for states makes it difficult for the EU to play along. On an ad hoc basis it 
needs to come to an agreement with a third state or an international organisation 
to regulate its status abroad. This is further complicated by the fact that in most 
cases external competences are divided between the EU and its member states. A 
practical issue, for instance, concerns the provision of diplomatic passports. Most 
Member States (CZ, FR, IRL, LUX, LV, NL, PL, SK, SW) offer passports to EEAS 
officials of their nationality, while others cannot do so without legal changes (DE, 
EE, GR). Germany is reluctant to grant diplomatic passports because it would feel 
compelled to provide them to all Commission officials as well. FR, GR, IRL, SW 
support the idea of a common European travel document (laissez-passer 
discussions were halted in 2009 with the objective of issuing all EEAS officials with 
a high quality travel document).  
 
 
5. Diplomatic and consular support 
 
 Another question is to what extent Delegations would also be able to act as legal 
representatives of EU citizens, for instance when the member state of origin does 
not have a diplomatic or consular representation in the particular third state. This 
question is related to the more general question whether and to what extent 
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Delegations would be competent to act on behalf on EU citizens and to protect 
their interests abroad.  
 
 The March 2010 draft decision mentioned ‘support the Member States in their 
diplomatic relations and in their role of providing consular protection to Union 
citizens in third countries”. The EEAS Council Decision refers to the same rights 
but adds the qualification that this must be “on a resource-neutral basis” (Article 
5(10)). 
 
 Articles 3(5) TEU and 23 TFEU provide the basis for diplomatic protection and 
consular assistance to EU citizens. Article 3(5) TEU obliges the EU to protect the 
interests of its citizens abroad, and persons holding the nationality of a member 
state are citizens of the Union (Article 20(1) TFEU). The issue is currently under 
discussion on the basis of a proposal for a Council Directive on 
consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad. In relation to a number of 
issues, the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) 
proposed the inclusion of an additional role of the Union delegations in consular 
protection as well as a clear coordinating role of the EEAS.120 However, member 
states are divided on how far the implementation of these provisions should go. 
Some  support a greater role for the EU Delegations in consular affairs. There 
seems room for discussion on a specification of a civil protection or evacuation 
role of Delegations for facilitating, pooling and disseminating information drawing 
on the experiences of Japan and Syria. In the long term, if the Union were to 
achieve full diplomatic maturity, the most far-reaching implication might be that 
the EU provide such protection as if the persons concerned were ‘nationals of the 
EU’ for the purposes of international law. While Article 3(5) TEU could 
accommodate that interpretation, the role explicitly foreseen in the EEAS 
Decision for diplomatic protection and consular assistance by the EU currently 
does not, and is merely supplementary. What is certain from the perspective of 
the EEAS, is that if the Union wishes to pursue such a role for EU Delegations 
abroad, significantly more financial and human resources will need to be 
allocated to the EU diplomatic service. The December 2011 EEAS evaluation 
report stated that “it is difficult to see how this objective could reasonably be 
achieved “on a resource- neutral basis” as required by the EEAS Decision. It would 
certainly not be responsible for raising citizens’ expectations about the services to 
be provided by EU Delegations, beyond their capacity to deliver in such a sensitive 
area. And the existing expertise within the EEAS in this area is extremely limited. 
However, over the past year we have also seen that EU Delegations can play an 
important role in the coordination of evacuations of citizens and that pragmatic 
solutions can be found on the ground. 
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  Report of 10 October 2012, PE 492.575v03-00, A7-0288/2012 on the proposal for a Council 
directive on consular protection for citizens of the Union abroad, (COM(2011)0881 – C7-0017/2012 – 
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 Article 5(8) of the Council Decision refers to third states and not to international 
organisations. Yet, the legal representation of the Union may also become 
relevant there.  
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ARTICLE 6 
Staff 
1. This Article, except paragraph 3, shall apply without prejudice to the Staff Regulations of Officials of 
the European Communities (‘Staff Regulations’) and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants 
of those Communities (‘CEOS’), including the amendments made to those rules, in accordance with 
Article 336 TFEU, in order to adapt them to the needs of the EEAS.  
2. The EEAS shall comprise officials and other servants of the European Union, including personnel 
from the diplomatic services of the Member States appointed as temporary agents.  
The Staff Regulations and the CEOS shall apply to this staff.  
3. If necessary, the EEAS may, in specific cases, have recourse to a limited number of specialised 
seconded national experts (SNEs).  
The High Representative shall adopt rules, equivalent to those laid down in Council Decision 
2003/479/EC of 16 June 2003 concerning the rules applicable to national experts and military staff on 
secondment to the General Secretariat of the Council ( 1 ), under which SNEs are put at the disposal of 
the EEAS in order to provide specialised expertise. 
4. The staff of the EEAS shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of 
the Union in mind. Without prejudice to the third indent of Article 2(1) and Articles 2(2) and 5(3), they 
shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person 
outside the EEAS or from any body or person other than the High Representative. In accordance with 
the second paragraph of Article 11 of the Staff Regulations, EEAS staff shall not accept any payments 
of any kind whatever from any other source outside the EEAS.  
5. The powers conferred on the appointing authority by the Staff Regulations and on the authority 
authorised to conclude contracts by the CEOS shall be vested in the High Representative, who may 
delegate those powers inside the EEAS.  
6. Recruitment to the EEAS shall be based on merit whilst ensuring adequate geographical and gender 
balance. The staff of the EEAS shall comprise a meaningful presence of nationals from all the Member 
States. The review provided for in Article 13(3) shall also cover this issue, including, as appropriate, 
suggestions for additional specific measures to correct possible imbalances.  
7. Officials of the Union and temporary agents coming from the diplomatic services of the Member 
States shall have the same rights and obligations and be treated equally, in particular as concerns 
their eligibility to assume all positions under equivalent conditions. No distinction shall be made 
between temporary agents coming from national diplomatic services and officials of the Union as 
regards the assignment of duties to perform in all areas of activities and policies implemented by the 
EEAS. In accordance with the provisions of the Financial Regulation, the Member States shall support 
the Union in the enforcement of financial liabilities of EEAS temporary agents coming from the 
Member States’ diplomatic services which result from a liability under Article 66 of the Financial 
Regulation.  
8. The High Representative shall establish the selection procedures for EEAS staff, which shall be 
undertaken through a transparent procedure based on merit with the objective of securing the 
services of staff of the highest standard of ability, efficiency and integrity, while ensuring adequate 
geographical and gender balance, and a meaningful presence of nationals from all Member States in 
the EEAS. Representatives of the Member States, the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission shall be involved in the recruitment procedure for vacant posts in the EEAS. 
9. When the EEAS has reached its full capacity, staff from Member States, as referred to in the first 
subparagraph of paragraph 2, should represent at least one third of all EEAS staff at AD level. 
Likewise, permanent officials of the Union should represent at least 60 % of all EEAS staff at AD level, 
including staff coming from the diplomatic services of the Member States who have become 
permanent officials of the Union in accordance with the provisions of the Staff Regulations. Each year, 
the High Representative shall present a report to the European Parliament and the Council on the 
 54 
occupation of posts in the EEAS.  
10. The High Representative shall lay down the rules on mobility so as to ensure that the members of 
the staff of the EEAS are subject to a high degree of mobility. Specific and detailed arrangements shall 
apply to the personnel referred to in the third indent of Article 4(3)(a). In principle, all EEAS staff shall 
periodically serve in Union delegations. The High Representative shall establish rules to that effect.  
11. In accordance with the applicable provisions of its national law, each Member State shall provide 
its officials who have become temporary agents in the EEAS with a guarantee of immediate 
reinstatement at the end of their period of service to the EEAS. This period of service, in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 50b of the CEOS, shall not exceed eight years, unless, it is extended for a 
maximum period of two years in exceptional circumstances and in the interest of the service.  
Officials of the Union serving in the EEAS shall have the right to apply for posts in their institution of 
origin on the same terms as internal applicants.  
12. Steps shall be taken in order to provide EEAS staff with adequate common training, building in 
particular on existing practices and structures at national and Union level. The High Representative 
shall take appropriate measures to that effect within the year following the entry into force of this 
Decision. 
 
This long article addresses staffing issues at the EEAS. As Article 27(3) TEU envisaged 
the composition of the Service only in general terms (“shall comprise officials from 
relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the 
Commission as well as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the 
Member States”), the EEAS Decision had to include a fair degree of detail, –on what 
are primarily internal matters. Frequent reference is made in this article to the 
(amended) Staff Regulations and to the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants 
(CEOS).121 The amended Staff Regulations note that, “in view of [the Service’s] 
specific tasks, the EEAS should be granted autonomy within the framework of the 
Staff Regulations”.  For the purposes of the Staff Regulations and the CEOS, the EEAS 
should be treated as an institution of the Union. 
 
 
1. Composition 
 
 The basic (initial) composition of the staff had already been determined in the 
final report of the Convention’s Working Group VII on External Action of 16 
December 2002, which touched upon staffing for the projected EEAS en passant, 
mentioning that it would be composed of staff from DG Relex, Council Secretariat 
officials and staff seconded from the national diplomatic services.122 The 2005 
Barroso and Solana Joint Progress Report stressed the importance of having a 
“sufficient number” of national diplomats in the EEAS and argued that they 
should be temporarily assigned, rather than seconded, so that all staff should 
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 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending the Staff Regulations of Officials 
of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those 
Communities, PE-CONS 52/10, Strasbourg, 9 November 2010. 
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 Final Report of Working Group VII on External Action, Brussels, CONV 459/02, 16 December 2002, 
p. 6. 
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have the “same status and conditions of employment”. It was also agreed that 
the nomination of staff to the EEAS should be “based on merit with appropriate 
selection procedures”.123 A fiche on “Specific arrangements concerning EEAS 
staff” of 12 October 2009 helpfully distinguished between the staffing demands 
of the initial set-up of the Service and the following period and noted the need for 
a policy of mobility in order to avoid the creation of “flagged posts”.124 
 
 The High Representative’s “Step Change” document, which was in effect a 
preview of the March 2010 draft decision, gave an overview of both the 
architecture of the Service as well as reaffirming many of the previously discussed 
staffing aspects, including transitional arrangements for the start-up of the 
Service and a pledge that the EEAS Decision would establish the principle of 
rotation within the EEAS.125 The actual explanatory memorandum of the March 
draft decision reiterates many of the above points but, somewhat curiously, 
introduces the Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA), which is a 
selection panel for senior appointments (director and above) as well as having a 
more general mandate to monitor gender and geographical balance, although this 
is not mentioned in the EEAS Decision itself.126 The list of staff due to be 
transferred to the EEAS (was) transmitted in an annex to this document 
communicated almost a month later.127 
 
 The specifics of how to ensure the desired one-third contribution from the 
member states (at AD level) received further thought and attention in a report by 
the High Representative on the contribution from the member states in June 
2010.128 
 
 Amendments to the Staff Regulations and CEOS were necessary to incorporate 
the EEAS. The revised Regulations reflect many of the issues discussed in the 
travaux préparatoires, such as the balance between AD officials coming from 
member states’ diplomatic services and permanent EU officials. The issue of 
geographical and gender balance was discussed intensively during the co-decision 
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procedure, resulting in the legal text being supplemented by statements by the 
High Representative pledging appropriate action to promote geographical and 
gender balance.129 Reference in Article 6(1) of the Council Decision to Article 336 
TFEU serves as a reminder of the procedures for the amendment of the Staff 
Regulations (“in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after 
consulting other institutions concerned...”). 
 
 Article 6(2) of the Council Decision reaffirms the composition of the EEAS. It 
should be noted that the general wording of the paragraph serves both the 
current (transition) composition of the EEAS until 30 June 2013 (in line with 
Article 98(1) of the Staff Regulations) and the situation thereafter whereby the 
Service shall consider applications of officials from other EU institutions. 
 
 The importance of the quota of permanent officials to temporarily assigned 
diplomats reflects concerns stemming from a number of the travaux 
préparatoires. Article 6(9) does not specify when the EEAS should ‘reach full 
capacity’ but the amended Staff Regulations make it clear that this should be by 1 
July 2013 (at which time derogations from Article 98(1) of the Staff Regulations 
should desist). The latest EEAS report on staffing, reflecting the situation as of 1 
June 2012, demonstrates good progress on attaining the desired one-third level 
for staff from the member states at AD level. The paragraph refers only to a 
general balance and does not specify how any such balance should be attained 
between the headquarters and Delegations. The indication of the desirable 
‘balance’ between temporarily assigned national diplomats and EU officials gives 
rise to the question, with regard to paragraphs 6 and 8, of whether other forms of 
balance should not be expressed in general terms. 
 
 The situation following expiry of the derogations noted above (which will coincide 
with the review of the EEAS) implies that direct recruitment to the Service will be 
possible on the basis of open competition, beyond the pool of primarily 
transferred staff (see Article 7 of the Council decision) who comprised much of 
the initial Service. The likely implications of this for any necessary rebalancing in 
line with Article 6(6 and 8) should be carefully considered. 
 
 The Rules regarding Seconded National Experts referred to in Article 6(3) of the 
Council Decision have since been adopted.130 Paragraph 3 states that rules shall 
be adopted equivalent to those laid down in Council Decision 2003/479/EC of 16 
June 2003, but these have since been repealed and replaced by Council Decision 
2007/829/EC of 5 December 2007. 
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 Article 6(7) reflects concerns voiced in the travaux préparatoires regarding equal 
treatment of national diplomats and officials of the Union, according them the 
same rights and obligations. This is confirmed in the amended Staff Regulations 
(Preamble, fourth recital). 
 
 
2. Appointing authority 
 
 A report from the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs 
stressed that “all staff of the EEAS should have the same permanent or temporary 
status and the same rights and obligations irrespective of origin”, that the powers 
of appointing authority within the EEAS should reside with the High 
Representative/Vice-President, and that EEAS staff should “possess a certain 
objective independence”.131 The Swedish Presidency Report to the European 
Council of 23 October 2009 also assigned the High Representative as the 
appointing authority.132 In this context, Article 6(5) of the Council Decision is 
rather straightforward. 
 
 In practice those appointments at director level and above require a decision by 
the High Representative/Vice-President while those below are delegated. This is 
confirmed in the Staff Regulations (third recital of the preamble and Article 95(1)). 
 
3. Meaning of merit and relationship with geographical/gender balance 
 
 Notions such as “merit” and “adequate geographical and gender balance” (see 
paragraphs 6 and 8 of Article 6) are subjective terms and are open to 
interpretation. The former, however, could be understood in terms of whether a 
candidate for a position within the Service meets the job requirements expressed 
in the job announcement. The EP amendments to the March draft decision 
suggested that equivalent measures should be undertaken akin to Council 
Regulation 401/2004/EC, which advocated that special temporary measures 
should be undertaken departing from the Staff Regulations due to the 
“exceptional nature” of the “forthcoming enlargement”–i.e. some form of special 
recruitment should be envisaged (but this only deals with geographical balance 
and does not address adequacy or meaningful presence). The word ‘ensuring’ was 
introduced by MEP Franziska Brantner et al. to ensure “stronger and more 
appropriate phrasing”.  
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 The wording of paragraph 8 of the same article confuses the situation further by 
referring to “adequate geographical and gender balance, and a meaningful 
presence of nationals from all Member States”; thus introducing a further layer of 
subjectivity without reference to the Staff Regulations or other internal 
documents that might add meaning to these terms. The High Representative is 
authorised to “promote equal opportunities for the under-represented gender in 
certain function groups, more particularly in the AD function group” in Articles 
1d(2-3) of the amended Staff Regulations. Given that specific mention of the 
balance issue is made in relation to the forthcoming review (Article 13(3)), the 
lack of any precision regarding the nature of any inadequacy and its possible 
consequences may pose problems. 
 
 
4. Selection procedures 
 
 As has been suggested above, paragraphs 6 and 8 are somewhat duplicative and 
could be merged and, if not, the confusing reference to gender and geographical 
balance in this paragraph could be omitted since it appears in paragraph 6. The 
absence of any mention of the Consultative Committee on Appointments (CCA) is 
understandable since it was not formally created until March 2011. Its 
establishment, however, was clearly envisaged in the High Representative’s 
explanatory memorandum accompanying the March draft decision. 133  The 
explanatory memorandum notes that in addition to their duties regarding senior 
appointments, the CCA “shall also monitor selection procedures at other levels in 
the EEAS and the development of EEAS staffing, including with regard to gender 
and geographical balance”.134 Since the issue of geographical and gender balance 
is mentioned twice in this article, the role of the CCA could now be usefully 
mentioned in terms of its general mandate as well as its specific duties regarding 
the monitoring of geographical and gender balance, especially in the absence of 
any other objective measurement of balance. Mention of the CCA would also 
permit the High Representative to ask them for further guidance on the 
development of this facet. With regard to this paragraph and paragraph 3, neither 
makes it clear that seconded national experts shall not be counted in the one-
third of all EEAS staff at AD level, although this is mentioned in the amended Staff 
Regulations (eighteenth recital of the preamble).  
 
5. Mobility, reinstatement and training 
 
 The CCA met on 14 June 2012 to discuss the evolution of EEAS mobility policy 
being developed on the basis of Article 6(10) of the Council Decision. The Service 
is at an early stage of the development of such a policy. The principal challenge 
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facing the EEAS is its absorption capacity to make room for those rotating back to 
headquarters from the Delegations. A further challenge is the diversity of national 
systems of mobility. 
 
 Article 6(11) also addresses concerns raised in the travaux préparatoires, this time 
regarding the rights of temporary agents serving in the EEAS from the Member 
States to ensure immediate reinstatement. The paragraph mentions Article 50(b) 
of the CEOS, which specifies that staff from national diplomatic services may be 
engaged “for a maximum period of four years” and that “contracts may be 
renewed for a maximum period of four years”, with the engagement not 
exceeding eight years in total (with exceptional provision for an extension of a 
further two years). It should, however, be noted that the principle of mobility (see 
paragraph 10) implies that member state diplomats who have served four years 
and who wish to remain for a further four years, would not be guaranteed 
automatic renewal and would have to apply for a new job; whereas the possibility 
of continuing service at the end of the eighth year is an extension of an existing 
contract. 
 
 The provisions on “adequate common training, building in particular on existing 
practices and structures at national and Union level” (Article 6(12) of the Council 
Decision) were predicated upon the assumption that the EEAS would have some 
budgetary independence in this regard. The inclusion of EEAS-related training 
under the Commission’s budget (DG HR) and the existence of pre-existing 
framework contracts mean that the EEAS has been unable to fully develop 
“adequate common training” and has not systematically involved “practices and 
structures at national and Union level”. It is debatable whether the steps taken 
are adequate, and there is relatively little national involvement. This aside, the 
expression of a timescale that has now passed is inappropriate and serves as a 
specific example of the overall emphasis of the EEAS Decision upon the 
establishment of the Service in its transitory phase – not as a document that looks 
much beyond the immediate period until the first major review in mid-2013. 
Hence, the choice is to amend the paragraph with more specific directions and an 
amended timescale or to delete it. 
 
 
6. Conduct 
 
 Finally, Article 6(4) of the Council Decision reminds EEAS staff that they shall carry 
out their duties “solely with the interests of the Union in mind”. Reference is 
made to several other parts of the EEAS Decision (Articles 2(1) third indent, 2(2) 
and 5(3)). The main implication of these references is to ensure that such conduct 
is reflected as broadly as possible, which includes the support role played by the 
Service with regard to the High Representative/Vice-President, as well as the 
President of the European Council, the President of the Commission, and the 
Commission (as stipulated by Arts 2(2) and 3 of the EEAS Decision), which 
significantly broadens the envisaged function of the Service as laid out in Article 
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27(3) TEU. It also applies to Heads of Delegation.135  Complications may arise with 
temporarily assigned diplomats who may have taken similar oaths of allegiance in 
the national context. In practical terms, it may be difficult to determine whether 
national diplomats always conduct themselves “solely with the interests of the 
Union in mind”. It is worth noting that “an EEAS official who has to carry out tasks 
for the Commission as part of his duties” is expected to follow instructions given 
by the Commission in accordance with Article 221(2) TFEU (Staff Regulations, fifth 
recital of the preamble and Article 96). 
 
 A comparison of the provision with the June draft decision demonstrates that the 
only substantive concern with Article 6 was the insertion of a stipulation that 
EEAS staff may not accept any payments of any kind from any source outside the 
Service. 
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ARTICLE 7 
Transitional provisions regarding staff 
 
1. The relevant departments and functions in the General Secretariat of the Council and in the 
Commission listed in the Annex shall be transferred to the EEAS. Officials and temporary agents 
occupying a post in departments or functions listed in the Annex shall be transferred to the EEAS. 
This shall apply mutatis mutandis to contract and local staff assigned to such departments and 
functions. SNEs working in those departments or functions shall also be transferred to the EEAS 
with the consent of the authorities of the originating Member State. 
These transfers shall take effect on 1 January 2011. 
In accordance with the Staff Regulations, upon their transfer to the EEAS, the High Representative 
shall assign each official to a post in his/her function group which corresponds to that official’s 
grade. 
2. The procedures for recruiting staff for posts transferred to the EEAS which are ongoing at the 
date of entry into force of this Decision shall remain valid: they shall be carried on and completed 
under the authority of the High Representative in accordance with the relevant vacancy notices 
and the applicable rules of the Staff Regulations and the CEOS.  
 
One of the initial challenges of the EEAS was integrating staff from EU institutions 
and member states. Paras. 1-2 of this Article deal with the transitional 
arrangements for staff of the Council General Secretariat and the Commission 
who were transferred to the EEAS and seek to maintain the privileges, status, 
and mobility of Council and Commission staff. This article was required when 
around 1,500 staff were transferred to the EEAS on 1 January 2011.   
 
 The “relevant departments”, as envisaged by Article 27(3) TEU are laid out in 
the annex attached to the Council Decision.  The annex refers to 
“administrative entities”  but the list provided is not intended to prejudge 
“the additional needs and the allocation of resources to be determined in the 
overall budget negotiations establishing the EEAS, nor decisions on the 
provision of adequate staff responsible for support functions, nor the linked 
need for service-level arrangements.” The Council decision does, however, 
effectively prejudge these issues by stipulating in Article 1(15) that the EEAS 
should be guided “by the principle of cost-efficiency aiming toward budget 
neutrality.”  This raises the interesting issue of what might happen if there 
were found to be inadequate staff for support functions, which might imply 
budgetary adjustments beyond ‘neutrality’. 
 
 The Swedish Presidency report emphasised that there should be no 
distinction made between the sources of staff in terms of conditions and 
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tasks.136 The transitional period meant that the human resources department 
initially faced a number of questions, complaints and administrative issues 
relating to the transitional provisions touching upon issues such as functions, 
responsibilities, promotion, pay, leave and social benefits. These 
administrative issues have largely been dealt with. Importantly, the equal 
treatment of staff from different backgrounds is vital to establishing a strong 
esprit de corps within the new Service. 
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ARTICLE 8 
Budget 
 
1. The duties of authorising officer for the EEAS section of the general budget of the European Union 
shall be delegated in accordance with Article 59 of the Financial Regulation. The High Representative 
shall adopt the internal rules for the management of the administrative budget lines. Operational 
expenditure shall remain within the Commission section of the budget. 
2. The EEAS shall exercise its powers in accordance with the Financial Regulation applicable to the 
general budget of the European Union within the limits of the appropriations allocated to it. 
3. When drawing up estimates of administrative expenditure for the EEAS, the High Representative 
will hold consultations with, respectively, the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and 
the Commissioner responsible for Neighbourhood Policy regarding their respective responsibilities. 
4. In accordance with Article 314(1) TFEU, the EEAS shall draw up estimates of its expenditure for the 
following financial year. The Commission shall consolidate those estimates in a draft budget, which 
may contain different estimates. The Commission may amend the draft budget as provided for in 
Article 314(2) TFEU. 
5. In order to ensure budgetary transparency in the area of external action of the Union, the 
Commission will transmit to the budgetary authority, together with the draft general budget of the 
European Union, a working document presenting, in a comprehensive way, all expenditure related to 
the external action of the Union. 
6. The EEAS shall be subject to the procedures regarding the discharge provided for in Article 319 TFEU 
and in Articles 145 to 147 of the Financial Regulation. The EEAS will, in this context, fully cooperate 
with the institutions involved in the discharge procedure and provide, as appropriate, the additional 
necessary information, including through attendance at meetings of the relevant bodies. 
 
At first sight Article 8 is an oddly structured provision, which contains cryptic 
formulations and ample cross-references to treaty articles and secondary legislation. 
Yet, it is an important article, as it determines the scope of budgetary control the 
EEAS has over its organisation and functioning. Article 8 is a provision which bears 
the marks of the inter-institutional strife in the travaux préparatoires, and one that 
packs a few surprises, such as the qualification of the EEAS as an institution – albeit 
for budgetary matters only (Section 1), a reference to the ‘powers’ of the Service and 
other peculiarities (Section 2). 
 
1. The EEAS, an institution for budgetary purposes137 
 
 In its October 2009 ‘guidelines’ to the future HR/VP, the European Council 
stated that “The EEAS should be a service of a sui generis nature separate from 
the Commission and the General Secretariat of the Council. It should have 
autonomy in terms of administrative budget and management of staff”.138 
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 Although on the basis of Article 27(3) TEU the European Parliament only needed 
to be consulted on the draft EEAS Decision, the EP enjoys the right of co-
decision with regard to both the staff and budgetary regulations which needed 
to be amended to operationalise the EEAS. The EP maximised its negotiating 
position on the former by coupling the two issues and wielding its veto power 
over the latter. 
 
 The EP undertook to promote the ‘Community’ method, for instance by 
proposing to increase the influence of the Commission on the administrative, in 
particular the budgetary structures of the new Service. The EP stated its belief 
that: “(...) as a service that is sui generis from an organisational and budgetary 
point of view, the EEAS must be incorporated into the Commission’s 
administrative structure, as this would ensure full transparency”.139 In their Non-
paper on the EEAS, MEPs Brok and Verhofstadt insisted that the EEAS should be 
an autonomous service assisting the HR/VP and accountable to the European 
Parliament, both in political and budgetary terms.140 
 
 In the quadrilogue, the EP negotiated rather successfully to enhance the 
influence of the Commission on the administrative structure of the EEAS, in 
particular with regard to budgetary procedures. In the talks it became clear that 
the EEAS would have to follow the same budget lines and administrative rules as 
applicable to the EU budget falling under Heading V of the Multiannual Financial 
Framework.141 Article 8(1) EEAS Decision reinforces this by prescribing that – all 
– “operational expenditure shall remain within the Commission section of the 
budget”, and not just the operational expenditure arising from the 
implementation of the CFSP budget and a number of  programmes,142 as 
proposed by the HR/VP in Article 7(3) of her draft EEAS Decision of March 2010.  
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 The EU operational expenditure is the total EU programme budget less the 
administrative expenditure administrative costs of the European Commission.143 
The administrative cost calculation is both financial and in kind. The financial 
cost calculation is towards the fixed overhead costs, such as rental of offices, 
expenses of meetings and publications. The in-kind expenditure refers to the 
supply of human resources to the EEAS through the secondment of national 
experts. These experts are cost-free for the EU as their salary and benefits are 
covered by their employers in their home countries. 
 
 The Commission also obtained the discretionary power to consolidate budget 
estimates and to amend the budget (Article 8(4)).144 Such a budgetary procedure 
is fully in keeping with the general rules of the TFEU, which prescribe that, with 
a view to helping to prepare the establishment of the EU’s annual budget, the 
institutions of the Union have to draw up budget estimates, and that it is the 
competence of the Commission to consolidate and (wherever necessary or 
considered appropriate) to amend these budget estimates.145 The EEAS emerges 
here – by implication – as an institution of the Union with respect to budgetary 
matters. 
 
 The EP hammered the importance of the institutional status of the EEAS home 
(i.e. to the Council and the HR/VP) during the negotiations on the collateral 
Financial Regulation. Regulation No 1081/2010 amended the existing Financial 
Regulation applicable to the general budget so as to include the European 
External Action Service as an “institution” with a specific section in the Union 
budget.146 
 
 Thus, also for the discharge procedure the EEAS should been seen as an 
institution and therefore “fully subject to the procedures provided for in Article 
                                                             
 
143
 See, generally,  <http://ec.europa.eu/budget/explained/budg_system/structure/struct_en.cfm> 
(last accessed 31 January 2013). Note that Article 41 TEU speaks of “operating” budget. 
 
144
 This provision (and the Commission competence included in it) did not feature in the HR/VP’s 
proposal of 25 March 2010. 
 
145
 Article 314(1) TFEU (first two sentences): “With the exception of the European Central Bank, each 
institution shall, before 1 July, draw up estimates of its expenditure for the following financial year. 
The Commission shall consolidate these estimates in a draft budget which may contain different 
estimates.” 
 
146
 Article 1(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 November 2010 amending Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the 
Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, as regards the 
European External Action Service, OJ 2010 L 311/ 9.” 
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319 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in Articles 145 
to 147 of the Financial Regulation”.147 
 
 The budgetary lines between the EEAS and the Commission were further 
tightened in the area of development cooperation and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). According to Article 8(3) EEAS Decision, the 
estimates of administrative expenditure in these areas have to be drawn up by 
the HR “in consultation with the Commissioners for Development Policy and for 
European Neighbourhood Policy regarding their respective responsibilities”.148 
The Financial Regulation extended this obligation of budgetary cooperation to 
international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response.149 Such a 
provision of close cooperation did not feature in the original HR/VP proposal at 
all. 
 
 Further, the internal auditors of the EEAS and the Commission would have to 
cooperate to ensure the audit policy. In accordance with the applicable rules, 
and as is the case for other institutions, a part of the annual report of the Court 
of Auditors is dedicated to the EEAS,150 and the EEAS is expected to respond to 
such reports.151 
 
 Finally, the European Office Against Fraud (OLAF) has been granted investigative 
powers with regard to the EEAS.152 
 
 From the foregoing, one can draw a few conclusions. Firstly, operational 
expenditure (i.e. excluding costs for administration) remains within the 
Commission section of the budget. This gives the Commission control over what 
the EEAS can do in the operational sphere. Secondly, with regard to 
administrative expenditures in three shared competence areas (development, 
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 See third preambular paragraph of the EEAS Decision.  
 
148
 Again, this provision did not feature in the HR/VP’s proposal of 25 March 2010.  
 
149
 Article 1(6) of the 2010 Financial Regulation: “The High Representative will hold consultations with 
the Members of the Commission responsible for development policy, neighbourhood policy and 
international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response, regarding their respective 
responsibilities.” 
 
150
 See, e.g., Court of Auditors, Annual Report Concerning the Financial Year 2011, OJ 2012 C 344, 
Chapter 9, paragraphs 9.25-9.28: EUR 682 Mio made in payments, amounting to 0,5% of the EU total. 
 
151
 See the discussion under Article 3(4) EEAS Decision, above. 
 
152
 Ibid. See Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 
1999 concerning investigations conducted by the European anti-fraud office (Olaf), OJ 1999 L 136/1. 
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ENP, and international cooperation, humanitarian aid and crisis response) the 
EEAS and the Commission have to consult each other. Thirdly, the budgetary 
procedures of the EEAS have been aligned with those of the Commission. This 
should facilitate cooperation. Fourthly, the standard procedures for drawing up 
budget estimates and for the discharge of the budget apply to the EEAS as well. 
As such, the EEAS has emerged as an institution with regard to budgetary 
matters, with its own section in the EU budget. But, fifthly, the assumption of 
these specific responsibilities does not by itself enhance the status of the EEAS 
as an institution in the sense of Article 13 TEU. Rather, these responsibilities 
enhanced the position of the European Parliament as a budgetary authority over 
the EEAS. From a political and institutional perspective, the outcome of the 
negotiations on the 2010 Council Decision and the collateral Financial 
Regulation has enhanced the position of the EP as a budgetary authority and 
strengthened its supervisory powers over the EEAS. The EP’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee (AFET) got it right when it said that the operational part (in particular 
the management of the external action programmes) of the EEAS budget would 
be part of that of the Commission, whereas the administrative part would 
remain separate from the EU budget but still fall under the control of the EP.153 
 
2.  Institutional and procedural peculiarities 
 
(i) Split budget lines: representation and delegation 
 
 Article 8 opens with a rather cryptic paragraph which, when deciphered, 
exposes a multi-layered regulatory framework. In its first sentence it states that 
“The duties of authorising officer for the EEAS section of the general budget of 
the European Union shall be delegated in accordance with Article 59 of the 
Financial Regulation.” According to Article 59(1) of Council Regulation No 
1605/2002, the “institution shall perform the duties of authorising officer”.  
Article 8(1) thus implicitly qualifies the EEAS as an “institution” for the 
budgetary matters contained in the provision. 
 
 According to Article 59(2) of the Financial Regulation, “[e]ach institution shall lay 
down in its internal administrative rules the staff of an appropriate level to 
whom it delegates in compliance with the conditions in its rules of procedure 
the duties of authorising officer, the scope of the powers delegated and the 
possibility for the persons to whom these powers are delegated to sub-delegate 
them”. Resonating the language of the Financial Regulation, the second 
sentence of Article 8(1) states that “The High Representative shall adopt the 
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 See EP press release of 30 June 2010, “External Action Service: EP's budgetary powers guarantee 
parliamentary oversight”. 
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internal rules for the management of the administrative budget lines”. To that 
end, the HR adopted Decision PROC HR(2011) 001 of 31 January 2011 “On the 
Internal Rules on the implementation of budget of the European External Action 
Service (Section X)”.154 As such, the HR “represents” the EEAS in performing the 
duties of authorising officer pursuant to Article 59(1) of the Financial Regulation. 
 
 In accordance with Article 59(3)155 and (4)156 of the Financial Regulation, the 
High Representative decided to delegate the Service’s “powers of budget 
implementation to the Chief Operating Officer (Director General for Budget and 
Administration), who carries out the duties of delegated authorising officer of 
the EEAS” and who exercises those delegated powers “in accordance with the 
provisions of the ‘Charter of tasks and responsibilities of authorising officers by 
delegation’, which the authorising officer by delegation shall sign upon taking up 
duty and whenever any changes are made to the Charter”.157 The powers 
delegated to the Chief Operating Officer under these internal rules allow him to 
implement the budget by making budgetary and legal commitments, validating 
and authorising payments, establishing entitlements and issuing recovery 
orders, taking individual decisions on the award of grants or public contracts and 
proposing transfers of appropriations in accordance with the Internal Rules.158 
As delegated authorising officer, the Chief Operating Officer may in turn 
delegate his powers to sub-delegated authorising officers,159 in keeping with the 
principles, rules and limits fixed in Articles 7-11 of the Internal Rules. 
 
 In order to ensure the “continuity of the functioning of Union Delegations and, 
in particular, continuity and efficiency in the management of external aid by the 
Delegations”,160 the 2010 revision of the Financial Regulation added a fifth 
paragraph to Article 59: “Where Heads of Union Delegations act as authorising 
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 Ref. Ares(2011)109103 - 01/02/2011. 
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 ”The powers of authorising officer shall be delegated or sub-delegated only to persons covered by 
the [Staff Regulations]“. 
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 “Authorising officers by delegation or sub-delegation may act only within the limits set by the 
instrument of delegation or sub-delegation. The responsible authorising officer by delegation or sub-
delegation may be assisted in his/her task by one or more members of staff entrusted, under his/her 
responsibility, to carry out certain operations necessary for implementation of the budget and 
presentation of the accounts”. 
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 Article 4(1) and (2) of HR PROC(2011) 001. 
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 Article 4(3) of HR PROC(2011) 001. 
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 Articles 6 resp. 5 of HR PROC(2011) 001. 
 
160
 Recital 7 in the preamble to Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 1081/2010. 
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officers by sub-delegation in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 
51, they shall be subject to the Commission as the institution responsible for the 
definition, exercise, control and appraisal of their duties and responsibilities as 
authorising officers by sub-delegation. The Commission shall, at the same time, 
inform the High Representative thereof”.161 
 
 In line with Article 317 TFEU, which attributes responsibility to the European 
Commission for the implementation of the operational budget, Article 59(5) of 
the Financial Regulation entrenches the rift between the EEAS and the 
Commission in matters of budgetary control, established by Article 8(1) EEAS 
Decision. The latter’s second sentence imposes an obligation on the HR to adopt 
internal rules for the management of “administrative budget lines”, whereas the 
third sentence prescribes that “[o]perational expenditure shall remain within 
the Commission section of the budget.” Thus, leaving aside the question of 
blurred boundaries between “administrative budget lines” and “operational 
expenditure”, the combination of Article 8(1) EEAS Decision and Article 59(5) of 
the 2010 Financial Regulation effectively creates split financial circuits at the 
level of EU Delegations. 
 
 In order to overcome potential difficulties arising from the split of circuits, 
procedures and accountability,162 Article 15 of the Internal Rules decided upon 
by the High Representative provides that “[o]n an exceptional basis, and for 
reasons of good budgetary execution, in the European Union’s Delegations, 
specific administrative arrangements may be agreed between the EEAS and the 
European Commission, in accordance with Article 50 of the Financial 
Regulation”.  
 
 The “Working arrangements between Commission services and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations issues” agreed to 
in January 2012 lay down in considerable detail how the financial circuits 
between the EEAS and the Commission pan out. It states, inter alia, that, the 
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 Article 51(2) of the Financial Regulation provides that ”the Commission may delegate its powers of 
budget implementation concerning the operational appropriations of its own section to the Heads of 
Union Delegations” and that, ”[w]hen Heads of Union Delegations act as sub-delegated authorising 
officers of the Commission, they shall apply the Commission rules for the implementation of the 
budget and shall be submitted to the same duties, obligations and accountability as any other sub-
delegated authorising officer of the Commission”. See, in this respect, Order of the General Court of 4 
July 2012 in Case T 395/11, Elti d.o.o. v. Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro, nyr. 
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 Recital 14 in the preamble to the EEAS Decision: “Decisions having a financial impact will, in 
particular, comply with the responsibilities laid down in Title IV of the Financial Regulation, especially 
Articles 64 to 68 thereof regarding liability of financial actors, and Article 75 thereof regarding 
expenditure operations”. 
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Heads of Delegation “can receive sub-delegation of power of authorising officer 
for budget implementation tasks belonging to the Commission's competence 
and responsibility, for operational appropriations only”. As such, the Heads of 
Delegation apply the Commission rules and are subject to the same duties, 
obligations and accountability as any other sub-delegated authorising officer of 
the Commission.163 They can sub-delegate these powers only to Commission 
staff in the Delegation, not to EEAS staff. Conversely, the Heads of Delegation 
can receive sub-delegation of power of authorising officer for budget 
implementation tasks belonging to the EEAS' competence and responsibility; 
powers which they can sub-delegate only to EEAS staff in the delegation, not to 
Commission staff.164 In the financial circuits in EU Delegations the roles of 
verification and authorisation are restricted to the staff belonging to each 
“institution”;165 with the exception of the double-hatted role of the Head of 
Delegation, in accordance with Article 51 of the Financial Regulation. 
 
 This split financial regime has been confirmed by order of the General Court, 
which observed that the EU Delegations may have a role of assisting the 
Commission in the implementation of the EU budget at local level, more 
specifically in the event of implementation of projects financed under EU 
external aid programmes. That assistance, the General Court ruled, “which is 
part of a sub-delegation to the Head of Delegation, is done under the strict 
control of the Commission, which is, pursuant to Articles 317 TFEU and 319 
TFEU, charged with the implementation of the budget and holds, under Article 
51 of the Financial Regulation, the power to withdraw the delegation granted.” 
In a rather liberal interpretation of its own jurisdiction,166 the General Court 
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 Article 60a of the Financial Regulation states that Heads of Union Delegations acting as authorising 
officers by sub-delegation must, first, report to their authorising officer by delegation concerning, 
inter alia, the management of operations sub-delegated to them and, second, reply to any request by 
the authorising officer by delegation of the Commission. According to Article 85 of the Financial 
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 Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, p. 5. See also responsibility for staff in EU Delegations in 
Article 5 EEAS Council Decision. 
 
165
 Nevertheless initiation tasks for the EEAS budget can be entrusted to Commission staff, in 
exceptional cases and on a transitional basis, as foreseen in the Internal Rules decision of both 
institutions. For more details on inter-service arrangements on financial issues, ibid., pp. 6-9. 
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 See the discussion under Article 1 EEAS Decision, above. 
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then concluded that it “follows from Article 221 TFEU, from the decision of 26 
July 2010 and from the relevant provisions of the Financial Regulation referred 
to above that the legal status of the Union Delegations is characterised by a two-
fold organic and functional dependence with respect to the EEAS and the 
Commission, which precludes their being considered a body for the purposes of 
Article 263 TFEU”.167  
 
 
(ii) Powers of the EEAS 
 
 Two observations can be made with respect to Article 8(2). The first concerns 
the one and only direct reference in the Council Decision to the “powers” vested 
in the EEAS itself. The second observation concerns the scope of those powers. 
 
 The use of terminology is striking if one considers that the EEAS Decision 
otherwise only speaks of the Service’s “tasks” (Articles 1(2) and 2). Whereas the 
latter are derivative from the powers vested in the High Representative (as 
outlined, notably, in Articles 18 and 27 TEU), the President of the European 
Council, the President of the Commission, and the Commission (in the exercise 
of their respective functions in the area of external relations), the reference to 
the EEAS’ own powers has to be understood in the sense that these are powers 
which have been bestowed upon the Service by virtue of Articles 8(1) EEAS 
Decision and 1(2) of the 2010 Financial Regulation, which – for budgetary 
matters – elevated the status of the European External Action Service to that of 
an “institution”. 
 
 As has been noted in the commentary on Article 8(1), the scope of the EEAS’ 
budgetary powers is limited to administrative expenditures. Paragraph 2 makes 
it clear that these powers will be exercised in accordance with the Financial 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the EU, “within the limits of the 
appropriations allocated to [the Service]”. 
 
(iii) Duty of cooperation 
 
 Article 8(3) provides that, “[w]hen drawing up estimates of administrative 
expenditure for the EEAS, the High Representative will hold consultations with, 
respectively, the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
 
167
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Commissioner responsible for Neighbourhood Policy regarding their respective 
responsibilities”. 
 
 The rationale for the inclusion of this paragraph lies within the agreement 
between member states that the establishment of the EEAS should be guided by 
the principle of cost-efficiency and the avoidance of unnecessary duplication of 
tasks, functions and resources with, e.g., the Commission.168 As such, the duty to 
consult enshrined in Article 8(3) is an elaboration of Article 3(2) and of the High 
Representative’s duty to ensure consistency in the Union’s external action 
pursuant to Articles 18(4), 21(3) and 26(2) TEU. 
 
 Apparent in paragraph 3 of Article 8 is the limitation of the scope of the HR’s 
duty to consult: it does not seem to concern such shared external competences 
areas as enlargement, humanitarian aid and crisis response. With respect to the 
shared competence areas of international cooperation, humanitarian aid and 
crisis response, the gap has been plugged by the 2010 revision of the Financial 
Regulation, which extends the obligation of budgetary consultation to these 
areas.169  Drawing up estimates of administrative expenditures in the field of EU 
enlargement, however, remains outside the scope of this obligation. This 
apparent limit to the obligation to consult is without prejudice to the general 
obligation of consultation enshrined in Article 3(2) EEAS Decision. Given that the 
EEAS is conceived as an “institution” for the purpose of Article 8, one may 
indeed consider that the obligation of Article 13(2) TEU could apply mutatis 
mutandis.  
 
 In the same vein, paragraph 3 puts a circumscribed obligation of initiative on the 
shoulders of the High Representative: it is s/he who shall consult the designated 
Commissioners; not the other way around. 
 
 The final word on drawing up the estimates, however, is with the European 
Commission. After all, Article 8(4) EEAS Decision prescribes that the Commission 
consolidates those estimates in a draft budget, “which may contain different 
estimates”; and that the Commission “may amend the draft budget as provided 
for in Article 314(2) TFEU”. As such, paragraph 4 echoes the procedure of Article 
314(1) TFEU: “(…) each institution shall, before 1 July, draw up estimates of its 
expenditure for the following financial year. The Commission shall consolidate 
these estimates in a draft budget, which may contain different estimates”. 
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 See recital 15 in the preamble to the EEAS Decision. 
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 Article 1(6) of the 2010 Financial Regulation. 
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 In order to ensure budgetary transparency in the area of external action of the 
Union, Article 8(5) tasks the Commission to transmit to the “budgetary 
authority”, i.e. the European Parliament, together with the draft general budget 
of the EU, a working document presenting, in a comprehensive way, all 
expenditure related to the external action of the Union. Arguably, this task is 
best executed if the Commission engages with the High Representative in the 
consultation called for in Article 8(3). 
 
(iv) Discharge 
 
 Finally, regarded as an institution for budgetary purposes, the EEAS is subject to 
the procedures regarding the discharge, as provided for in Article 319 TFEU and 
in Articles 145 to 147 of the Financial Regulation. In this context, the High 
Representative (or delegated officers within the EEAS) will provide the European 
Parliament with all necessary support for the exercise of the latter’s right as 
discharge authority.170 The EEAS is thus required to provide, as appropriate, the 
additional necessary information, including through attendance at meetings of 
the relevant bodies. As noted above, the EP has thus some sway over the 
administrative budget implementation by the Service. 
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 Article 8(6) states that “(…) the EEAS is obliged to fully cooperate with the institutions involved in 
the discharge procedure (…)”. 
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ARTICLE 9 
External action instruments and programming 
1. The management of the Union’s external cooperation programmes is under the responsibility of the 
Commission without prejudice to the respective roles of the Commission and of the EEAS in 
programming as set out in the following paragraphs. 
2. The High Representative shall ensure overall political coordination of the Union’s external action, 
ensuring the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action, in particular through 
the following external assistance instruments: 
— the Development Cooperation Instrument , 
— the European Development Fund , 
— the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights , 
— the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument , 
— the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries , 
— the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation , 
— the Instrument for Stability, regarding the assistance provided for in Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 
1717/2006. 
3. In particular, the EEAS shall contribute to the programming and management cycle for the 
instruments referred to in paragraph 2, on the basis of the policy objectives set out in those 
instruments. It shall have responsibility for preparing the following decisions of the Commission 
regarding the strategic, multiannual steps within the programming cycle:  
(i) country allocations to determine the global financial envelope for each region, subject to the 
indicative breakdown of the multiannual financial framework. Within each region, a proportion of 
funding will be reserved for regional programmes;  
(ii) country and regional strategic papers; 
(iii) national and regional indicative programmes. 
In accordance with Article 3, throughout the whole cycle of programming, planning and 
implementation of the instruments referred to in paragraph 2, the High Representative and the EEAS 
shall work with the relevant members and services of the Commission without prejudice to Article 1(3). 
All proposals for decisions will be prepared by following the Commission’s procedures and will be 
submitted to the Commission for adoption. 
4. With regard to the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation Instrument, any 
proposals, including those for changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents 
referred to in paragraph 3, shall be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the 
Commission under the responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and shall 
be submitted jointly with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission. Thematic 
programmes, other than the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, the Instrument 
for Nuclear Safety Cooperation and that part of the Instrument for Stability referred to in the seventh 
indent of paragraph 2, shall be prepared by the appropriate Commission service under the guidance of 
the Commissioner responsible for Development Policy and presented to the College of Commissioners 
in agreement with the High Representative and the other relevant Commissioners. 
5. With regard to the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, any proposals, including 
those for changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents referred to in paragraph 
3, shall be prepared jointly by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission under the 
responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Neighbourhood Policy and shall be submitted jointly 
with the High Representative for adoption by the Commission. 
6. Actions undertaken under: the CFSP budget; the Instrument for Stability other than the part referred 
to in the seventh indent of paragraph 2; the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries; 
communication and public Diplomacy actions, and election observation missions, shall be under the 
responsibility of the High Representative/the EEAS. The Commission shall be responsible for their 
financial implementation under the authority of the High Representative in his/her capacity as Vice-
President of the Commission. The Commission department responsible for this implementation shall 
be co-located with the EEAS. 
                                                             
 Footnote references have been suppressed here but are included in the discussion below. 
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Article 9 regulates the programming of external action instruments. It concerns only 
procedural issues, not policy issues. Whereas the management of the EU’s external 
cooperation programmes remains under the responsibility of the Commission, the 
HR is under a particular obligation to avail himself of these instruments so as to 
ensure the overall political coordination, the unity, consistency and effectiveness of 
the Union’s external action (Section 1). In the adoption of the external action 
instruments (Section 2), inter-service cooperation is crucial in the programming cycle 
in order to achieve policy coherence (Section 3). Unlike Articles 3 and 5 EEAS 
Decision, Article 9 does not extend to the evaluation of external assistance and 
financial responsibility, but these issues have been foreseen in the subsequently 
adopted inter-service “Working Arrangements” between the Commission and the 
EEAS (Section 4). 
 
1. Shared responsibilities and objectives 
 
 The reference in Article 27(3) TEU that the EEAS should comprise officials from 
“relevant departments” of the Commission and the General Secretariat of the 
Council, as well as diplomats from the member states, carried the obvious 
implication that the organisation and structures for development cooperation 
would be influenced by the emergence of the EEAS. In particular, the potential 
disappearance of most of the Commission’s DG Relex and DG Dev171 meant that 
many questions pertaining to the management, programming and 
implementation of external action instruments would be on the table.172 
 
 Yet, the negotiations leading up to the adoption of 2010 Council Decision did not 
have as great an effect on the division of external competences as proposed by 
some of the parties to the discussion. This applies to both the “Tasks” of the 
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EEAS (Article 2), in general, and to the specific provisions on “External action 
instruments and programming” (Article 9).173  These provisions changed only 
slightly, in the sense that the respective roles of the Commission and the HR/VP 
were articulated more clearly than in the HR/VP’s proposal of March 2010.174 
 
 In the context of (business) administration, “management” is the process of 
dealing with or controlling things or people; the responsibility for and control of 
a company or organisation. Management in all business and organisational 
activities is the act of getting people together to accomplish desired goals and 
objectives using available resources efficiently and effectively. Management 
comprises designing, planning, organising, staffing, leading or directing, and 
controlling an organisation (a group of one or more people or entities) or effort 
for the purpose of accomplishing a goal. 
 
 According to Article 9(1), the management of the EU’s external cooperation 
programmes is “under” the responsibility of the Commission “without prejudice 
to the respective roles of the Commission and of the EEAS in programming”. 
Thus, the Commission retains overall responsibility for dealing with and 
controlling the Union’s external cooperation programmes, whereas it shares the 
role of “programming”, i.e. designing, scheduling, or planning the EU’s external 
cooperation programmes (only an element of the wider concept of 
“management”), with the EEAS. In short, the basic prescript, namely that during 
the whole process of planning and implementation both parts of the 
organisation should work together and that all proposals for decision have to be 
prepared through the Commission procedures and submitted to the 
Commission (Article 9(3)), has remained unchanged. 
 
 In comparison with the HR/VP’s proposal of March 2010, Council Decision 
2010/427/EU lays down more clearly the obligation (“shall”) of the HR to ensure 
the overall political coordination, the unity, consistency and effectiveness of the 
Union’s external action. As such, Article 9 EEAS Decision offers an elaboration of 
the obligation contained in Article 21(3) TEU: in the implementation of this 
obligation, the HR shall avail himself “in particular” of the external assistance 
instruments listed in paragraph 2. Arguably, the obligation of ensuring “overall 
political coordination” by the HR – not the VP – is superimposed on the 
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 Compare Article 9 EEAS Decision to Article 8 of the HR/VP’s proposal of 25 March 2010. 
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 See the EP’s Amendments 131 (on the role of the Commission) and 132 (on the role of the HR/VP), 
in Amendments 76 – 143 of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of 1 July 2010 (document 
2010/0816(NLE)). 
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Commission’s responsibility for the management of the EU’s external assistance 
programmes.175 
 
 The first phrase of Article 9(2) is almost identical to the formulation of the 
second sentence of Article 26(2) TEU176 but should not be seen as a lex specialis 
thereof. After all, the primary object of Article 26(2) TEU is how the CFSP is to be 
put into effect. The scope of Article 9(2) EEAS Decision is broader as it refers to 
the Union’s external action writ large. Neither is there a link with Article 26(3) 
TEU, which deals with Union resources, as EU external assistance instruments 
pertaining to the CFSP are dealt with Article 9(6) EEAS Decision. 
 
 In its contribution to the Union’s external cooperation programmes, the EEAS is 
expected to work towards ensuring that the programmes fulfil the objectives for 
external action as set out in Article 21 TEU, in particular in paragraph (2)(d) 
thereof,177 and that they respect the objectives of the Union’s development 
policy in line with Article 208 TFEU.178 In this context, the EEAS should also 
promote the fulfilment of the objectives of the “European Consensus on 
Development”179 and the “European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid”.180 
 
2. Instrumentarium 
 
 The HR is under a legal obligation to ensure overall political coordination of the 
Union’s external action so as to meet his Treaty obligation to ensure the unity, 
consistency and effectiveness of the Union’s external action, in particular by 
coordinating the following external assistance instruments listed in Article 9(2): 
 the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI)181, 
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 See the discussion under Article 2(1) EEAS Decision, above. 
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 “The Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy shall 
ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of action by the Union”. 
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 “[F]oster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing 
countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty”. 
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 See Recital 4 of the Preamble to the EEAS Decision. 
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 OJ 2006 C 46/1. 
 
180
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council — Towards a 
European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (COM(2007) 317 final, not published in the Official Journal. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 
2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ 2006 L 378/41. 
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 the European Development Fund (EDF)182, 
 the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)183, 
 the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)184, 
 the Instrument for Cooperation with Industrialised Countries (ICI)185, 
 the Instrument for Nuclear Safety Cooperation (NSCI)186, 
 the Instrument for Stability, regarding the assistance provided for in Article 
4 of Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 (IfS).187 
 
 Humanitarian assistance, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA)188 
and financial assistance to non-European Overseas Countries and Territories 
(OCTs) are not covered by Article 9 of the EEAS Decision. The programming and 
management of these instruments are unified and will continue to be managed 
by the Commission, under the responsibility of DG ECHO, DG ELARG, and DG 
DEVCO respectively. Nevertheless, DG ECHO and DG ELARG will consult the EEAS 
on strategic priorities when preparing the Multiannual Financial Framework for 
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 Council Regulation No 5 laying down rules relating to calls for and transfers of financial 
contributions, budgetary arrangements and administration of the resources of the Development Fund 
for the Overseas Countries and Territories, OJ 1958 L 681/58. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 1889/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 
2006 on establishing a financing instrument for the promotion of democracy and human rights 
worldwide, OJ 2006 L 386/1. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 2006 
laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, 
OJ 2006 L 310/1. 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 382/2001 of 26 February 2001 concerning the implementation of 
projects promoting cooperation and commercial relations between the European Union and the 
industrialised countries of North America, the Far East and Australasia, OJ 2001 L 57/10. 
 
186
 Council Regulation (Euratom) No 300/2007 of 19 February 2007 establishing an Instrument for 
Nuclear Safety Cooperation, OJ 2007 L 81/1. 
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 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 November 
2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability, OJ 2006 L 327/1. Article 9(2) EEAS Decision does not 
pertain to the political coordination by the HR when it concerns assistance in response to situations of 
crisis or emerging crisis. The provision only relates to the HR’s political coordination of assistance in 
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and organised crime, including illicit trafficking of people, drugs, firearms and explosive materials and 
in the effective control of illegal trade and transit; support for measures to address threats to 
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mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or 
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 Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 of 17 July 2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA), OJ 2006 L 210/82. 
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the IPA and on IPA programming, through the inter-service consultation 
process.189 
 
 The Commission Secretariat General and DG BUDG are responsible for the 
preparation of the Multiannual Financial Framework post-2013, in close 
cooperation with relevant services of the Commission and the EEAS. In this 
context, the EEAS and the relevant Commission services have to ensure a 
coordinated position in relation to any external relations instruments. This also 
relates to changes in the basic regulations and the programming documents 
referred to in Article 9(3) EEAS Decision, which will have to be prepared jointly 
by the relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission: under the 
responsibility of the Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy insofar 
as the ENPI is concerned (Article 9(5), and the Commissioner responsible for 
Development Policy for the EDF and DCI (Article 9(4)). According to the last 
paragraph of Article 9(3) the decisions shall be submitted jointly, with the 
HR/VP, for adoption by the Commission. 
 
 In view of the next Multi-annual Financial Framework (2014-2020), Article 9(2) 
will need to be amended to take account of the new generation of instruments, 
including the renamed “European Neighbourhood Instrument” and the 
“Partnership Instrument for cooperation with third countries”.190 
 
3. Inter-service cooperation in the programming cycle 
 
 According to Article 9(3), the EEAS is under a legal obligation (“shall”) to 
contribute to the programming and management cycle for the instruments 
                                                             
 
189
 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, para. 3.13 (ECHO). For IPA, see para. 3.12: 
“Planning and programming of pre-accession assistance is under the responsibility of DG 
ELARG/REGIO/EMPL/AGRI as the case may be. Strategic and multi-annual planning documents will be 
prepared by the lead service of DG ELARG, or DG REGIO/EMPL/AGRI as the case may be. The 
Commission staff in Delegations will be closely associated to the preparation of programmes and 
projects including: needs assessments, project identification, consultation with local stakeholders, 
donors and EU Member States. (…) As regards decentralised management, the responsibility for 
conferral of management powers rests with DG ELARG/EMPL/REGIO/AGRI. The EU Delegations will be 
responsible for monitoring the implementation of decentralised management in their country of 
responsibility. DG ELARG will coordinate with DG REGIO, EMPL and AGRI as regards the components 
of pre-accession assistance of their responsibility, with a view to ensure harmonised and consistent 
approaches and instructions issued to Delegations.” 
 
190
 See Joint Communication “Global Europe: a new approach to financing EU external action”,  
COM(2011) 865 final, Brussels, 7.12.2011; and Foreign Affairs Council, Press Release 11688/12, 
PRESSE 282, 25 June 2012. 
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referred to in paragraph 2. In doing so, the Service shall use the policy objectives 
set out in those instruments as a basis for its contribution. 
 
 In particular, the responsibility has been bestowed upon the EEAS to prepare 
Commission decisions concerning strategic, multiannual steps within the 
programming cycle, on three particular counts: “(i) country allocations to 
determine the global financial envelope for each region, subject to the indicative 
breakdown of the multiannual financial framework. Within each region, a 
proportion of funding will be reserved for regional programmes; (ii) country and 
regional strategic papers; (iii) national and regional indicative programmes”. 
 
 Throughout the entire cycle of programming, planning and implementation of 
the instruments referred to in Article 9(2), the High Representative and the EEAS 
are under a legally binding obligation (“shall”) to work with the relevant 
members and services of the Commission,191 without prejudice to the fact that 
the EEAS is placed under the authority of the High Representative.192 As such, 
Article 9(3) provides a lex specialis to the duty of sincere cooperation between 
the EU institutions. 
 
 The implementation of this particular strand of the obligation has been spelled 
out in the “Working Arrangements between Commission services and the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) in relation to external relations issues” 
of 13 January 2012.193 That document provides, inter alia, that the Commission 
services and the EEAS “will perform their respective tasks throughout the 
programming and implementation cycle in full transparency, informing and 
consulting each other, sufficiently in advance, on initiatives or announcements 
that could have an impact on each other’s areas of responsibility. This includes 
an exchange of information on preparation of policy and programme documents 
of both a formal and informal nature. It relates to the representation of EU 
positions vis-à-vis recipient countries or other donors and related reporting and 
feedback.”194  
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 See the discussion under Article 3 EEAS Decision, above. 
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 See the discussion under Article 1(3) EEAS Decision, above. 
 
193
 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012. As in the context of the discussion of Article 3 
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“Working arrangements”. See, in this respect, the Court’s judgment in case C-25/94, Commission v. 
Council (FAO), [1996] ECR I-1469, paragraph 49: “[T]he Arrangement between the Council and the 
Commission represents fulfilment of that duty of cooperation between the Community and its 
Member States within the FAO. It is clear, moreover, from the terms of the Arrangement, that the 
two institutions intended to enter into a binding commitment towards each other.” 
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 As noted above, all proposals for decisions concerning strategic, multiannual 
steps within the programming cycle have to (“shall”) be prepared jointly by the 
relevant services in the EEAS and in the Commission, by following the 
Commission’s procedures, and will be submitted to the Commission for 
adoption: under the authority of the Commissioner responsible for 
Neighbourhood Policy for the ENPI (Article 9(5)), and the Commissioner 
responsible for Development Policy for EDF and DCI (Article 9(4), first sentence). 
Specifics on the inter-service cooperation are to be found in the “Working 
Arrangements”.195 
 
 Thematic programmes “shall be prepared by the appropriate Commission 
service under the guidance of the Commissioner responsible for Development 
Policy and presented to the College of Commissioners in agreement with the 
High Representative and the other relevant Commissioners” (Article 9(4), 
second sentence). In this respect, two observations can be made. First, the 
Commissioner for Development has been given an elevated status when it 
comes to preparing thematic programmes.196 Second, the obligation does not 
apply to the preparation of thematic programmes under the EIDHR and the 
NSCI,197 and that part of the IfS referred to in Article 9(2).198 Because the ENPI is 
covered by Article 9(5), and because Article 9(6) covers actions undertaken 
under the CFSP budget, the part of the IfS other than that referred to in 
paragraph 2,199 the ICI,200 press, communication and public diplomacy actions,201 
and EIDHR election observation missions (EOM),202 one can reason a contrario 
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 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, para. 3.4. 
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 See Explanatory Memorandum, Council Decision Establishing the organisation and functioning of 
the European External Action Service, 25 March 2010: “horizontal Communications on Development 
Policy will be prepared by the relevant Commission services under the guidance of the Commissioner 
for Development, and presented to the Commission in association with the relevant Vice-Presidents 
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 Ibid., para. 3.6 
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 SEC(2012)48, Ref. Ares(2012)41133 - 13/01/2012, para. 3.7. 
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 Ibid., para. 3.9. 
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 Ibid., para. 3.11. 
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 Ibid., para. 3.10. 
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that the provision in the second sentence of Article 9(4) only applies to the 
preparation of thematic programmes under the EDF and DCI. Arguably, this is a 
rather cumbersome way of legal drafting. 
 
 The High Representative, and the EEAS which acts in support of the HR, are 
endowed with the responsibility for actions undertaken under the above-
mentioned headings in Article 9(6). Arguably, the phrase “actions undertaken” 
goes beyond the scope of preparatory actions referred to in the preceding three 
paragraphs, i.e. actions of a strategic nature, pertaining to multiannual steps 
within the programming cycle. Yet, the responsibility for actions referred to in 
paragraph 6 does not encompass the financial implementation of the CFSP 
budget, the IfS (other than the part referred to in paragraph 2), the ICI, 
communication and public diplomacy actions, and election observation 
missions. It is the Commission which is responsible for this aspect, albeit  – 
usefully  – under the authority of the first Vice-President of the Commission. The 
Commission department responsible for this implementation, i.e. the Foreign 
Policy Instruments Service (FPI), is co-located with the EEAS. 
 
 According to the “Working Arrangements” on inter-service cooperation 
between the Commission services and the EEAS, “[p]roposals for CFSP actions 
are discussed in relevant Council working parties (thematic or geographic 
working groups or, in the case of civilian CSDP missions, the Committee for the 
Civilian aspects of crisis management CIVCOM). As the Commission 
representative in the relevant Council Working Parties (Relex Counsellors or, in 
the case of CSDP missions, the Committee for civilian aspects of crisis 
management), the Foreign Policy Instrument Service is consulted by the EEAS 
from an early stage and fully involved in discussions on possible CFSP actions. 
After political agreement by the Political and Security Committee to launch a 
CFSP action, the FPI prepares the necessary budgetary impact statement for 
each CFSP action (containing an estimate of its costs), in consultation with 
relevant Commission services and the EEAS. The Relex Counsellors’ working 
party endorses the budget of the action. Once the Council adopts a CFSP action 
under Article 28 TEU, this serves as the basic act on the basis of which the FPI 
prepares a Financing Decision on which it consults relevant Commission services 
through accelerated and restricted inter-service consultation. Given the nature 
of these proposals, the HR/VP has an empowerment from the Commission, as a 
Vice-President, to adopt these Commission Financing Decisions. This may be 
delegated to the Director of the FPI. FPI implements these Financing Decisions. 
Civilian CSDP missions deployed on the ground as well as their Civilian Planning 
and Conduct Capability (CPCC) may be requested to provide technical advice, 
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throughout the programming cycle, and on topics that fall within their mandate 
and realm of expertise”.203 
 
4. Evaluation of external assistance and financial responsibility 
 
 The evaluation of external assistance and financial responsibility are topics 
which are not covered by Article 9 EEAS Decision but which get special attention 
in the inter-service “Working Arrangements”.204  These arrangements prescribe 
that DGs DEVCO, ELARG, ECHO and the FPI are responsible for the evaluation of 
external assistance under the EU instruments in their areas of responsibility,205 
and that implementation of operational expenditure can only be performed by 
the Commission.206 
 
 The evaluation of the results of country, regional and sectoral policies, 
programmes and programming performance is conducted by the evaluation unit 
of DG DEVCO or DG ELARG. The Commission and the EEAS have agreed that it is 
up to the so-called “Group of External Relations Commissioners” to monitor its 
work through regular reports by the relevant Commissioner. Arguably, this 
Group’s mandate, covering the chain from programming to implementation, 
allows a comprehensive view of EU cooperation in a sector or with a country. To 
ensure coherence on all levels, the “Working Arrangements” foresee that the 
evaluation unit is also the service responsible for evaluation methodology. The 
reports from evaluations of country, regional and sectoral policies, programmes 
and programming performance will be shared with the EEAS and other 
Commission services. 
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ARTICLE 10 
Security 
1. The High Representative shall, after consulting the Committee referred to in point 3 of Section I of 
Part II of the Annex to Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council’s security 
regulations, decide on the security rules for the EEAS and take all appropriate measures in order to 
ensure that the EEAS manages effectively the risks to its staff, physical assets and information, and 
that it fulfils its duty of care and responsibilities in this regard. Such rules shall apply to all EEAS staff, 
and all staff in Union Delegations, regardless of their administrative status or origin.  
2. Pending the Decision referred to in paragraph 1:  
— with regard to the protection of classified information, the EEAS shall apply the security measures 
set out in the Annex to Decision 2001/264/EC,  
— with regard to other aspects of security, the EEAS shall apply the Commission’s Provisions on 
Security, as set out in the relevant Annex to the Rules of Procedure of the Commission.  
3. The EEAS shall have a department responsible for security matters, which shall be assisted by the 
relevant services of the Member States.  
4. The High Representative shall take any measure necessary in order to implement security rules in 
the EEAS, in particular as regards the protection of classified information and the measures to be 
taken in the event of a failure by EEAS staff to comply with the security rules. For that purpose, the 
EEAS shall seek advice from the Security Office of the General Secretariat of the Council, from the 
relevant services of the Commission and from the relevant services of the Member States.  
 
Article 10 of the EEAS Decision is simply entitled “security”, that is, security rules as 
they relates to both the protection of classified information and (all) other aspects of 
security within the EEAS, applied to all EEAS staff as well as all staff in Union 
Delegations. The EEAS security rules raise at least three important questions: first, 
whether these rules constitute a specific part of an EU-wide security framework 
(Section 1); second, whether they amount to the best standards in diplomatic 
security (Section 2) and third, how they relate to the new Council rules on classified 
information (Section 3). 
 
 
1. EEAS security rules: a specific part of an EU-wide security framework? 
 When the EEAS started operating on 1 January 2011 provision was made for 
the fact that it would not by then have adopted its own security rules and that 
their full adoption by this ‘functionally autonomous’ body might take some 
time. In the meantime, Article 10(2) explicitly provided that the existing 
Council rules (at that time, from 2001)207 would apply with regard to the 
                                                             
 Footnote references have been suppressed here but are included in the discussion below. 
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 Annex to Council Decision 2001/264/EC of 19 March 2001 adopting the Council's security 
regulations, OJ 2001 L 101/ 1. 
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protection of classified information and the existing Commission rules (also 
from 2001)208 would apply with regard to “other aspects of security”. From the 
way it is presented in the EEAS Decision this seems like a neat division; in fact it 
is not. Both measures contain the general security rules of the two respective 
institutions, the Council and the Commission, and overlap to a considerable 
extent. From the manner in which Article 10(2) is phrased it seems that only 
the Council rules apply to the protection of classified information as such and 
only the Commission rules to (all) “other aspects of security”.  
 
 This potentially unclear situation did not last for long because on 15 June 2011 
the EEAS formally adopted its own security rules as explicitly envisaged in 
Article 10(1).209 The decision lays down the rules for the safety and security of 
the EEAS and establishes the general regulatory framework for managing 
effectively the risks to staff, physical assets and information, and for fulfilling 
its duty of care. The EEAS security rules are considered equivalent to the 
security rules of the Commission and the 2011 security regulations of the 
Council.210 They replace the application of the Commission rules with regard to 
the organisation of security in the EEAS and the allocation of security tasks 
within EEAS structures.211 They do not, however, cover “the protection of 
classified information” as such. Since the High Representative has not yet 
adopted specific rules in this regard within the EEAS, the Council rules on the 
classification of documents in the Council security regulation are still 
applicable.   
 
 By the time the EEAS adopted its own security rules, the Council had adopted 
general new security rules (in March 2011) and provision could be made for 
these rules to apply to the protection of classified information within the EEAS, 
until the moment that the High Representative adopts specific EEAS rules in 
this regard. Those rules must in any event be equivalent to those set out in the 
Council rules.212 The 2011 Council security rules themselves provide for a wide-
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reaching system of equivalence of the Council rules among a wide variety of 
institutions (the Commission and the European Parliament) as well as agencies 
and bodies or offices (in any event these include the EEAS, Europol, Eurojust 
and others) as well as the member states. The EEAS security rules explicitly aim 
to “achieve a more coherent, comprehensive general framework within the 
European Union for protecting classified information, building on the Council 
security rules and the Commission security provisions”.213 The EEAS security 
rules exemplify the nature of the EEAS as a central policy hub that offers a 
point of contact and channel of coordination and cooperation between 
national and EU actors, rather than as a purely autonomous EU agency or 
body.214 It comprises Commission and Council officials as well as a meaningful 
presence of nationals from all member states and aims to offer an 
environment in which national diplomatic and intelligence services are willing 
to share and exchange valuable and sensitive information. 
 
 The Council’s explicit strategy, reflected in its decision, is to obtain the 
necessary commitment from the Commission, the member states, the other 
EU institutions, agencies, bodies and offices, to comply with its rules and 
standards in order to protect the interests of the Union and its member states. 
Several declarations appended to the Council Decision make this perfectly 
clear. In particular, “the Council and the Commission consider that their 
respective security rules, and the Agreement between the Member States, 
meeting within the Council, regarding the protection of classified information 
exchanged in the interests of the European Union, together constitute a more 
comprehensive and coherent general framework within the European Union 
for the protection of classified information originating in the Member States, in 
institutions of the European Union or in EU agencies, bodies or offices, or 
received from third States or international organisations.”215 Article 3(1) of the 
EEAS security rules specifically requires the High Representative to adopt rules 
for protecting classified information that are “equivalent” to those set out in 
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protection and handling of classified information). 
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Council Decision 2011/292/EU. Yet the High Representative has not (yet) done 
so and at the time of writing (early 2013) it is understood that it is still being 
worked on and may have some supplementary elements (in particular 
emphasis on support by the services of the member states).216 The EEAS is not 
alone in not (yet) having adopted specific rules on classified information 
equivalent to the new rules of the Council; it seems that the Commission has 
not yet done so either despite being “committed” to applying equivalent 
security standards for protecting European Union Classified Information 
(hereinafter: EUCI). Subsequent to the adoption of the Council security rules at 
the end of March 2011, the intention was that the Commission would adopt 
new security rules too, explicitly modelled on those of the Council, which 
would then be included as a new annex to its rules of procedure. This is in line 
with its earlier practice since 2001 when it systematically modified its own 
rules in parallel with those of the Council. It is not clear why the Commission 
has not now formally done so. Explicit provision was made for the two 
institutions to consult one another in advance of any further modification of 
their respective security rules.217 Several agencies had in fact already made 
their own provision for rules of confidentiality in advance of the new Council 
security rules.218 The EEAS came along afterwards.  
 
 EU agencies generally have well-established bilateral information-sharing 
relationships with each other. Information-sharing more generally serves not 
only for the purposes of priority-setting and policy-making, albeit in an 
unstructured manner, but also for the purposes of practical operational 
implementation. The EEAS is embedded in a much broader vision and practice 
of institutional unity. It also supports those satellite bodies that now fall under 
the authority of the High Representative (viz. the European Defence Agency, 
the European Union Satellite Centre, the European Union Institute for Security 
Studies and the European Security and Defence College).  
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 EU INTCEN, the acronym for the European Union Intelligence Analysis Centre, 
acts as the intelligence hub of the EEAS.219 In 2011, the Situation Centre 
(SitCen), which was located within the Council of Ministers, was renamed as 
EU INTCEN and structurally integrated within the EEAS. EU INTCEN produces all 
source intelligence assessments aimed to provide the Council with high quality 
information on public security. Traditionally, SitCen covered both external and 
internal security and the fact that EU INTCEN is now part of the EEAS means 
that the latter is gradually becoming a more robust and central element in the 
EU’s internal-external security nexus. The EU INTCEN is further part of the 
Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), which combines civilian intelligence 
(EU INTCEN) and military intelligence (EUMS INT DIR). The EEAS, like certain 
other EU agencies (Europol, Frontex), must be distinguished from intelligence 
agencies at the level of the member states themselves since none of the EU 
actors have “special powers” to collect information, such as the powers to 
intercept communications, conduct covert surveillance, use secret informants, 
etc. Nonetheless, a very important similarity between national intelligence 
agencies and the EU actors, including the EEAS, is that they receive, produce 
and disseminate information, including personal data and classified 
information. They analyse and disseminate information – on threats to internal 
security or other interests – to a broad variety of actors, including policy- 
makers andother executive bodies. They perform these functions both within 
the territory of the EU and in its relations with third countries and international 
organisations.220 International agreements concerning the protection of 
classified information, concluded between the Union and third parties, are 
applicable to the EEAS. The EEAS is in fact listed as one of the entities that form 
“the EU”.221 It can be expected that in future agreements between the Union 
and third countries on the security of classified information, which are 
negotiated under the authority of the High Representative, the EEAS will be by 
default included as one of the EU entities to which the agreement applies.222 
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2. EEAS security rules: best standards in diplomatic security?  
 
 Article 1 of the EEAS security rules provides that they apply to all EEAS staff, 
including officials and other servants, seconded national experts and local 
agents, and to all staff in EU Delegations. The High Representative ensures 
consistency and the application of the security rules, including security 
inspections (Article 11). S/he adopts more detailed measures for 
implementation on recommendation by a Security Committee (Article 9(6)) 
composed of national experts and representatives of the General Secretariat 
of the Council and the Commission. Article 2 envisages that security risks 
shall be managed as a process and “in line with the concept of defence in 
depth”. This approach to security risk management adopts classic “best 
practices’ strategies common in highly networked and technologically driven 
environments. For classified information security management as a process 
means that it shall be protected ‘throughout its life cycle”. As we have seen 
the EEAS has not yet adopted its own rules for protecting classified 
information equivalent to those of the Council. The Council’s 2011 security 
rules apply beyond CFSP to all information classified “in the interests of the 
Union”. This now seems to  apply also to the EEAS, whose work is not limited 
to foreign and security policy but covers the “overall political coordination of 
the Union’s external action” including, for instance, development 
cooperation, neighbourhood and partnership policy, cooperation with 
industrialised countries, and nuclear safety cooperation.223 
 
 Article 4 of the EEAS security rules addresses physical security for the 
protection of classified information, as well as staff and visitors. Article 5 
deals with personnel security clearance, which is the common term for 
eligibility for access to classified information. Security clearance is required 
for access to “TRÈS SECRET/TOP SECRET”, “SECRET” or “CONFIDENTIEL” texts, 
in accordance with the general EU rules.224 It is granted only to those for 
whom an appropriate personnel security background investigation has been 
completed by their home country's intelligence service. Article 6 specifically 
addresses security of communication and information systems and sets out 
requirements that the rules on the protection of classified information225 will 
                                                                                                                                                                              
from General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations, Exchange of EUCI with third states and 
international organisations, 12619/11, Brussels, 7 July 2011.  
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 See Article 9(2) EEAS Decision and Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules. 
 
224
 See also the discussion under Article 11 EEAS Decision, below. 
 
225
 Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules. 
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have to meet. These rules will further have to provide for security awareness 
and training226 and for consequences of security breaches.227 
 
 A Managing Directorate for the issues of administration, personnel, budget, 
security and information systems and communications operating within the 
EEAS is managed by Patrick Child under the supervision of the Chief 
Operating Officer, which shall ensure that appropriate physical and 
organisational measures are in place for the security and safety of staff and 
visitors, physical assets and information in all EEAS premises.228  
 
 Article 9 sets out the organisation of security in the EEAS, which is the 
responsibility of the Security Directorate (Article 9(4)). In addition to the 
internal Security Directorate (MDR B – Security – Director: Frans Potuyt), 
which consists of EEAS officials and is at the disposal of the High 
Representative, Article 9(6) establishes a Security Committee, which is 
composed of national experts and representatives of the General Secretariat 
of the Council and the Commission. The Security Committee is not formally 
part of the bureaucracy of the EEAS, but again exemplifies EEAS’ intention to 
institutionalise close cooperation between member states, the Council and 
the Commission. It makes recommendations to the High Representative on 
the implementation of the security rules (Article 1(6)) and the High 
Representative “shall seek its advice” on any security matter (Article 9(6)). A 
first meeting of the EEAS Security Committee was held on 21 September 
2011.229 
 
 Article 10 deals with the security of CSDP missions and EU Special 
Representatives. The responsibility lies with the head of mission or special 
representative pursuant to the rules in the decision establishing the mission. 
 
 Article 10(3) of the EEAS Decision stipulates that the competent services of 
the member states shall assist the EEAS Security Directorate. In contrast to 
some types of cooperation set out in the EEAS Decision, this assistance is not 
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 Paragraph 36 of European External Action Service, Report by the High Representative to the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, 22 December 2011, available at: 
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visited 31 January 2013).  
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reciprocal.230 The EEAS Security Directorate cooperates very closely with the 
relevant services in the Council Secretariat and the Commission. 
 
 Article 10(4) of the EEAS Decision mandates the High Representative to take 
the necessary measures to protect classified information. It should be read in 
combination with Article 3(1) of the EEAS security rules (see above). The 
continuing absence of specific EEAS rules on the protection of EUCI should 
not distract from the high relevance of the information created and shared 
by the EEAS to the Union’s overall use and protection of EUCI. Most classified 
documents relate to the Common Foreign and Security Policy231 and a 
significant number are received by the Council from the Commission and the 
EEAS. Furthermore, Council documents are in principle distributed to all 
members of the Council, the Commission and the EEAS and their relevant 
administrative services, which have to ensure that access is granted only to 
individuals with a need to know and security clearance if appropriate. Article 
10(4) of the EEAS Decision is another example of how much the EEAS is 
located equidistant between the Commission, the Council and the member 
states: “the EEAS shall seek advice from the Security Office of the General 
Secretariat of the Council, from the relevant services of the Commission and 
from the relevant services of the Member States.” Moreover, the future EEAS 
rules on the protection of EUCI can be expected to apply to Union 
delegations and missions. 
 
 
3. EEAS application of the Council’s rules on EUCI: equivalence with pitfalls? 
 The EEAS Decision still refers to the 2001 security rules of the Council. 
However, as we have already seen above, after the EEAS was established and 
operational, in March 2011 the Council adopted the next generation of 
security rules and formally introduced EUCI. These new security rules are 
much more far reaching in terms of scope and breadth of application than 
their 2001 counterpart. From 2011 the justifications for classifying 
documents include in general terms “the interests of the European Union” as 
well as those of “one or more of the Member States”. The EU now has 
marked out a classification system that applies across the broad spectrum of 
all its activities with no special mention or position given to the CFSP 
anymore. The adoption of EEAS specific rules on the protection of classified 
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 See discussion under Article 3 EEAS Decision, above. 
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 General Secretariat of the Council, Reply to Written Question E-004374/2012 put by Martin 
Ehrenhauser (NI), Doc. 10684/12 PE-QE 226, 4 June 2012. 
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information232 are required under the principle of equivalence to reflect the 
new Council security rules from 2011. In any event, they now apply fully in 
the EEAS context. 
 
 A balancing exercise needs to be performed between the interests of the EU 
or of the policy area in secrecy and  the need for classification and the 
interests of the public in transparency. But no provision is made for this 
balancing exercise to be carried out by the person deciding on the 
classification status of a particular document. Because of the way the 
classification system works, this person will not only be an EU official but can 
also be an official of a member state or of a third state or of another 
international organisation. This is due to the principle of originator control. 
This principle, abbreviated as ORCON, is deeply interwoven in the EU 
classification rules and means that the originator of a document, even if 
circulated in the EU context, retains control over what happens to its 
classification status. The principle of originator control allows originating 
governments or agencies/institutions to retain control over the 
declassification of information (if it is classified) or its release to non- 
governmental parties (if it is not). The ORCON rule thus eliminates the ability 
of states/agencies/international organisations to make their own judgments 
about the wisdom of releasing shared information. The requirement to 
consult the author (the originator) before granting public access or 
declassifying is deeply embedded within the Council’s rules but also features 
in several places in the access to documents legislation from 2001.233  
 
 Moreover, the principle of derivative classification means that the person 
classifying a new document who extracts parts  of an old classified document 
(from whatever source) for use in a new document will generally classify the 
new document at the highest level of classification of the old document, 
irrespective of whether the particular piece of information re-used actually 
justifies that. Both these practices can lead to over-classification, which 
means essentially unnecessary classification or unnecessarily high 
classification, to an accumulated culture of secrecy within a bureaucracy. As 
of yet, there is  no information available  in the public domain as to the 
numbers of classified documents created by the EEAS nor received by it from 
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Commission documents, OJ 2001 L 145/43. 
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other (internal and external) sources, nor the degree of its classified 
information sharing. 
 
 The main pitfalls of the system of information sharing of classified 
information in the EU context can be summarised as follows. First of all, 
information sharing and exchange can only go as far as member states allow 
it to go. Agencies, including the EEAS, have limited powers to make member 
states, as well as other actors, share information and experience difficulties 
in obtaining sufficient information.234 The EEAS may be comparatively 
advantaged by the fact that “at least one-third” of the EEAS staff directly 
comes from the member states.235 A pilot project for local exchange of 
classified information is being developed in cooperation with member states. 
For the new system to become operational security approvals at national 
level will have to be put in place.236 
 
 Secondly, in many cases sensitive information cannot be shared among 
agencies. Member states or other (international) actors remain “owners” of 
the information and it is only with the permission of the originator that this 
information can be shared. Classification and declassification are the 
monopoly of the respective institutions and bodies. Until very recently there 
was no procedure – or practice – of “declassification”. Now the Council has 
issued guidelines in this regard and the first “declassification” decisions are 
emerging.237 The guidelines apply mutatis mutandis to the EEAS.  
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 Information is shared among many sources (national and supranational; 
internal and external; private and public) and the information thus shared 
tends to be a commingling of both internal and external security aspects. 
What is more, how exactly and what information is being utilised and in what 
manner is not at all straightforward and serves a variety of different 
purposes, ranging from priority-setting and policy-making to actual 
operational implementation. There is a certain level of dislocation in the 
operational function of information, affected by the overall fragmentation 
characteristic of this area, more broadly. Ultimately, it makes it impossible to 
independently verify/check the reliability of such information. The problem is 
compounded at the EU level because the issue of security and classification 
rules is regulated purely at the level of the internal organisation rules of 
individual institutions.  
 
 The absence of overall external mechanisms acting as a check over a growing 
body of “secret” information is highly problematic at  EU level, given the 
growing scope for secrecy and the likelihood of over-classification that flow 
from the benefits that can be derived from the use of secrecy and the 
principles of originator control and derivative classification.238 A new external 
mechanism that is under development in this regard is the ongoing 
negotiation by the EEAS with the European Parliament of a specific inter-
institutional agreement to enable the EEAS to give the EP access to classified 
information. In effect, this is part of a wider strategy to engage the EP as a 
security actor alongside the other EU security actors, and may reduce the 
ability of the EP to perform its public accountability function fully and with 
publicity. 
 
  
                                                             
238
 See also D. Curtin, “Top Secret Europe,” inaugural lecture, University of Amsterdam, 2011, that 
attempts to launch a broader debate. Available at <http://oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-
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ARTICLE 11 
Access to documents, archives and protection 
 
1. The EEAS shall apply the rules laid down in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents. The High Representative shall decide on the implementing rules for the EEAS.  
2. The Executive Secretary-General of the EEAS shall organise the archives of the service. The relevant 
archives of the departments transferred from the General Secretariat of the Council and the 
Commission shall be transferred to the EEAS.  
3. The EEAS shall protect individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data in accordance 
with the rules laid down in Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 18 December 2000 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free movement of such data. The High 
Representative shall decide on the implementing rules for the EEAS. 
 
Article 11 relates to access to documents, archives and data protection. As Article 
11(2) regarding the EEAS archives appears to be rather self-explanatory, the 
following focuses on access to documents and data protection only. First, the 
application of the principle of transparency to the EEAS will be analysed on the basis 
of the applicable decision of the High Representative and of existing practice and 
case-law on access to documents containing information regarding foreign policy 
matters, mainly with respect to the application of Regulation 1049/2001 (section 1). 
Second, the application of the principle of the protection of personal data to the 
EEAS will be analysed on the basis of the applicable decision of the High 
Representative and existing case law and practice on personal data protection, 
mainly regarding Regulation 45/2001, and some reflections will be offered on the 
difficult balancing act between those two principles in the light of the European 
Court of Justice’s judgment in Bavarian Lager (section 2). 
 
1. The EEAS and the principle of transparency 
 
 Article 11(1) of the EEAS Decision provides for Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 of 
the European Parliament and the Council regarding public access to 
European Parliament, Council and Commission documents239 to apply to the 
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EEAS.240 Recital 7 in the preamble to that Regulation further notes that it 
applies to the CFSP.   
 
 Article 4(1)(a) of the Regulation determines that institutions are to refuse 
access to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of 
the public interest as regards public security, defence and military matters, 
and international relations, as well as the financial, monetary or economic 
policy of the Union or a member state.  
 
 Documents affecting public security, defence and military matters also 
constitute the category of “sensitive documents”. These originate from the 
institutions or the agencies established by them, from member states, third 
countries or international organisations, and are classified as “TRÈS 
SECRET/TOP SECRET”, “SECRET” or “CONFIDENTIEL” in accordance with the 
rules of the institution concerned.241  
 
 The Regulation does not contain any specific conditions or limitations 
applicable to the public access to documents in the sphere of the CFSP, which 
can be found in other documents, notably in Council Decision 2011/292/EU 
of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified 
information.242 It was noted earlier that pending the adoption by the High 
Representative of equivalent rules for protecting classified information, the 
EEAS is to apply mutatis mutandis those security rules of the Council, and the 
High Representative is to take all necessary measures to implement those 
rules in the EEAS.243  
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 On 19 July 2011, the High Representative adopted Decision 2011/C 243/08 
on the rules regarding access to documents.244 In accordance with that 
Decision, any citizen of the Union or any natural or legal person residing or 
having its registered office in a member state, is to have a right of access to 
EEAS documents according to the principles, conditions and limits laid down 
in Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 and the specific provisions laid down in the 
Decision. This right of access concerns documents held by the EEAS, namely, 
documents drawn up or received by it and in its possession.245 
 
 The European Court of Justice appears to be restrained in its review of 
decisions of institutions refusing access to documents on the basis of public 
interest. See, for example, Sison:  
o the Council must be recognised as “enjoying a wide discretion for the 
purpose of determining whether the disclosure of documents relating 
to the fields covered by those exceptions could undermine the public 
interest”; and  
o “the Community Court’s review of the legality of such a decision must 
therefore be limited to verifying whether the procedural rules and the 
duty to state reasons have been complied with, whether the facts 
have been accurately stated, and whether there has been a manifest 
error of assessment or a misuse of powers”.246  
 
 The General Court too has by and large been deferential and restrained in its 
review of the reliance on Article 4(1)(a) by other institutions.247 More 
recently, however, the General Court has appeared to be willing to conduct a 
very thorough review.248 A notable example in that regard is the In ‘t Veld 
case, which concerned an opinion of the Council’s Legal Service, issued in the 
context of the adoption of the Council decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations, on behalf of the EU, for an international agreement between 
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the EU and the USA in order to make available to the US Treasury 
Department financial messaging data to prevent and combat terrorism and 
terrorist financing. That opinion was, in essence, concerned with the legal 
basis of that decision and with the respective competences of the EU and the 
then EC:249 
o since the choice of the legal basis rests on objective factors and does 
not fall within the discretion of the institution, any divergence of 
opinions on that subject could not be equated with a difference of 
opinion between the institutions as to matters which relate to the 
substance of the agreement.  
 
o the mere fear of disclosing a disagreement within the institutions 
regarding the legal basis of a decision authorising the opening of 
negotiations on behalf of the EU was not a sufficient basis for 
concluding that the protected public interest in the field of 
international relations may be undermined.250  
 
o with the exception of those elements of the requested document that 
concern the specific content of the envisaged agreement or the 
negotiating directives, the Council had not shown how, specifically 
and actually, wider access to that document would have undermined 
the public interest in the field of international relations, and partially 
annulled the contested decision of refusal of access.251  
 
o the Council could therefore not reasonably rely on the general 
consideration that a threat to a protected public interest may be 
presumed in a sensitive area, in particular concerning legal advice 
given during the negotiation process for an international 
agreement.252   
 
o “the public interest in the transparency of the decision-making 
process would become meaningless if, as the Commission proposes, it 
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were to be taken into account only in those cases where the decision-
making process has come to an end”.253  
 
2. The EEAS and data protection 
 
 Regulation (EC) 45/2001254 does not cover activities that wholly fall within the 
scope of the CFSP. Nevertheless, Article 3(1), which provides that the 
Regulation is to apply “to the processing of personal data by all Community 
institutions and bodies insofar as such processing is carried out in the 
exercise of activities all or part of which fall within the scope of Community 
law”,255 does seem to imply that activities that are only partly within the CFSP 
are covered by the Regulation. At any rate, the status of the right to data 
protection as a fundamental right enshrined in Article 8 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the EU implies that it applies throughout the Union 
legal order, including in the CFSP.   
 
 On 8 December 2011, the High Representative adopted a decision on the 
rules regarding data protection,256 which lays down the implementing rules 
concerning Regulation (EC) 45/2001 as regards the EEAS.257 
 
 Regulation (EC) 45/2001 contains no reference to the possibility of disclosure 
of personal data for reasons of transparency. Conversely, Article 4(1)(b) of 
Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 provides that the institutions are to refuse access 
to a document where disclosure would undermine the protection of “privacy 
and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with 
Community legislation regarding the protection of personal data”. 
 
 The European Court of Justice had the chance to clarify the relationship 
between Regulation (EC) 45/2001 and Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 in Bavarian 
Lager. That case concerned the Commission’s decision to reject, on the basis 
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of Article 4(1)(b) of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, the request by Bavarian Lager 
for access to the full minutes of a meeting of 11 October 1996, after which 
the Commission withdrew a procedure for failure to fulfill obligations 
brought against the United Kingdom regarding a measure having equivalent 
effect to a quantitative restriction on imports of beer contrary to what is now 
Article 34 TFEU: 
o by limiting the application of the exception under Article 4(1)(b) to 
situations in which the privacy or  integrity of the individual would be 
infringed for the purposes of Article 8 of the ECHR and the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights, without taking into account the 
legislation of the Union concerning the protection of personal data, 
particularly Regulation (EC) 45/2001, the General Court had 
disregarded the wording of Article 4(1)(b), which is “an indivisible 
provision and requires that any undermining of privacy and the 
integrity of the individual must always be examined and assessed in 
conformity with the legislation of the Union concerning the protection 
of personal data, and in particular with Regulation No 45/2001”.258  
 
o where a request based on Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 seeks to obtain 
access to documents including personal data, the provisions of 
Regulation (EC) 45/2001 become applicable in their entirety.  
 
o By requiring that, in respect of the five persons present at the 
meeting who had not given their express consent to disclosure, 
Bavarian Lager establish the necessity for those personal data to be 
transferred, the Commission complied with the provisions of Article 
8(b) of Regulation (EC). 
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ARTICLE 12  
Immovable property 
 
1. The General Secretariat of the Council and the relevant Commission services shall take all 
necessary measures so that the transfers referred to in Article 7 can be accompanied by the 
transfers of the Council and Commission buildings necessary for the functioning of the EEAS. 
2. The terms on which immovable property is made available to the EEAS central administration 
and to the Union Delegations shall be decided on jointly by the High Representative and the 
General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, as appropriate. 
 
 
It was not only the personnel of the relevant Council and Commission 
departments that were transferred 259 but also the buildings required for the 
functioning of the EEAS. As with Article 7, to which it refers, Article 12 deals with 
the transitional arrangements that were needed for this transfer of immovable 
property. Bringing together staff from eight different buildings in Brussels was 
one of the first priorities of the HR/VP.260 
 
Article 12(2) refers to the terms on which immovable property was to be made 
available to the EEAS central administration and to the Union Delegations: these 
had to be decided on jointly by the HR/VP and the General Secretariat of the 
Council and the Commission, as appropriate. Indeed, at the time the Decision was 
adopted, a final arrangement had not been made. Originally, the expectation was 
that the EEAS would be based in the Commission’s Charlemagne building but the 
building was thought to be too small and would take too long to renovate. The 
HR/VP preferred to rent the Council’s Lex building but was rebuffed. In October 
2010 she chose the Axa/triangle building.261 
 
Is it worth mentioning, in passing, that the “functioning of the EEAS” included 
those specific tasks falling to the crisis management bodies262 which, due to the 
nature of their tasks, require a specific security environment. As a consequence, 
they were not transferred to the new premises referred to above. 
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ARTICLE 13 
Final and general provisions 
 
 
1. The High Representative, the Council, the Commission and the Member States shall be responsible 
for implementing this Decision and shall take all measures necessary in furtherance thereof.  
2. The High Representative shall submit a report to the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission on the functioning of the EEAS by the end of 2011. That report shall, in particular, cover 
the implementation of Article 5(3) and (10) and Article 9.  
3. By mid-2013, the High Representative shall provide a review of the organisation and functioning of 
the EEAS, which will cover inter alia the implementation of Article 6(6), (8) and (11). The review shall, if 
necessary, be accompanied by appropriate proposals for the revision of this Decision. In that case, the 
Council shall, in accordance with Article 27(3) TEU, revise this Decision in the light of the review by the 
beginning of 2014.  
4. This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. The provisions on financial 
management and recruitment shall take effect once the necessary amendments to the Staff 
Regulations, the CEOS and the Financial Regulation, as well as the amending budget, have been 
adopted. To ensure a smooth transition, the High Representative, the General Secretariat of the 
Council and the Commission shall enter into the necessary arrangements, and they shall undertake 
consultations with the Member States.  
5. Within one month after the entry into force of this Decision, the High Representative shall submit to 
the Commission an estimate of the revenue and expenditure of the EEAS, including an establishment 
plan, in order for the Commission to present a draft amending budget.  
6. This Decision shall be published in the Official Journal of the European Union. 
 
The last article of the EEAS Decision has a twofold function: first, it identifies the 
steps needed, and the actors responsible for implementing the Decision (Section 1) 
and second, it calls for the latter’s review and opens the way for its adaptation, “if 
necessary” (Section 2). 
 
 
1. Implementing the EEAS Decision 
 
 Paragraph 4 of Article 13 foresees that the EEAS Decision enters into force on 
the day of its adoption. Full implementation nevertheless required several 
preliminary steps, most notably the revision of the Staff and Financial 
Regulations.263 Moreover, in line with paragraph 5 (and Article 8(4)), the HR 
submitted an estimate of the revenue and expenditure of the Service to the 
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 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 1080/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
November 2010 amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, OJ 2010 L 311/1Regulations (EU, 
EURATOM) No 1081/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
amending Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to 
the general budget of the European Communities, as regards the European External Action Service, OJ 
2010 L 311/9. See the discussions under Articles 6 and 8 EEAS Decision, above. 
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Commission, so as to modify the EU budget and to provide the EEAS with a 
start-up budget (paragraph 5).264 The required transitional arrangements 
were thus entered into, while the above-mentioned Regulations were duly 
amended, all with the approval of the European Parliament. The completion 
of final negotiations on the EEAS Decision and the adoption of the three 
flanking measures in barely six months’ time triggered one insider to call it a 
“Guinness record for speed”.265 But, as noted above, the speedy compromise 
has come at a price: EU institutions and member states made sure to keep 
their influence over the new Service.266 
 
 Paragraph 1 of Article 13 stipulates that the implementation of the EEAS 
Decision is the responsibility not only of the High Representative, but also of 
the Commission, the Council and the member states; each of them being 
bound to take all necessary measures to that effect. That the Commission, 
the Council and the member states should be mentioned in this list is 
unsurprising. The organisation and the functioning of the EEAS were from the 
outset conditional upon each of these actors taking a whole series of 
practical steps, e.g. for the transfer of staff (Article 7) and buildings (Article 
12), as well as the additional measures evoked in the previous paragraph.  
 
 What is remarkable, however, is that the European Parliament is not 
explicitly included in the list of Article 13(1). Not so much because the 
Parliament had the right to be consulted in the process of adoption of the 
Council Decision (as per Article 27(3) TEU), but more in view of its essential 
role in allowing for the full implementation thereof. It is recalled that neither 
the staff provisions, nor the budget-related articles of the EEAS Decision 
could enter into force without the preliminary consent of the Parliament. 
Moreover, the Parliament’s budgetary powers entail a significant influence 
on the financial assets and thus operational capability of the Service.267 
Including the Parliament in the list of actors responsible for implementing the 
EEAS Decision would not only have reflected the reality, it could also have 
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and Council; Section III - Commission; Section X - European External Action Service (13475/2010 – C7-
0262/2010 – 2010/2094(BUD)). 
 
265
 P. Skytte Christoffersen, “A Guinness Record for Speed”, in E. Drieskens and L. Van Schaik (eds.), 
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increased the sense of ownership and thus of commitment by the Parliament 
towards the smooth functioning of the Service.   
 
 Indeed, in emphasising that the actors responsible for the EEAS Decision’s 
implementation “shall take all measures necessary in furtherance thereof”, 
Article 13(1) establishes an obligation of good faith, which echoes the 
provisions of Article 3 EEAS Decision on cooperation. Included in a CFSP act, 
such an obligation is admittedly limited in its normative effects, in view of the 
non-contamination principle of Article 40(1) TEU, the declarations to the 
Lisbon Treaty and the limited jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in 
this area, as evoked earlier.268 However, as it arguably encapsulates the 
principle of sincere cooperation enshrined in Article 4(3) TEU and Article 
13(2) TEU, the obligation referred to in Article 13(1) is not as toothless as it 
might initially look.    
 
2. Reviewing the implementation of the Decision 
 Given the originality of the EEAS in the EU institutional landscape, and the 
ambiguity of the provisions governing its organisation and functioning, it is 
unsurprising that the monitoring of the Decision’s implementation, and its 
possible revision, were deemed necessary.  
 
 Thus, paragraph 2 envisages that by the end of 2011, just a year after the 
EEAS actually began operating (see Article 7(1) EEAS Decision), the HR had to 
submit a report on its functioning, with a particular focus on the sensitive 
provisions on HR and Commission’ instructions to Heads of Delegations, the 
role of EU delegations in consular protection of Union’s citizens, and external 
action instruments programming. This report was submitted to the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission on 22 December 2011.269   
 
 More generally, Article 13(3) foresees that the organisation and functioning 
of the Service should be reviewed by mid-2013. Such a Review, which is the 
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basis of the current exercise, is to cover, notably, the EEAS’ composition and 
recruitment, in particular the geographical and gender balance of its staff, as 
well as member states’ representation therein, and formulate proposals for 
correcting possible imbalances (Article 6(6)).270 The same paragraph adds 
that the Review shall include, “if necessary”, appropriate proposals for the 
revision of the Decision. Such revision would then take place “by the 
beginning of 2014”, through the procedure used for its adoption, namely 
Article 27(3) TEU.  
 
 While the review process is underway, it is unclear whether a fully-fledged 
revision will be proposed. The protracted negotiations resulting from the 
demanding procedural requirements for the adoption of the EEAS Decision, 
and the significant role played therein by the European Parliament, may well 
dissuade certain member states from such a revision. The temptation might 
be to limit the review process to the formulation of recommendations which 
might become effective “à droit constant”, i.e. by using the interpretative 
room in the existing provisions without amending Council Decision 
2010/427/EU.  
 
 In light of this commentary, and considering implementation to date, the 
second EEAS 2.0 publication intends to assess whether such interpretative 
room exists to accommodate changes to the organisation and functioning of 
the EEAS, to formulate recommendations accordingly and/or to make 
proposals for revisions, if deemed necessary. 
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